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ALGORITHMIC ENTITIES 
LYNN M. LOPUCKI* 
ABSTRACT 
In a 2014 article, Professor Shawn Bayern demonstrated that 
anyone can confer legal personhood on an autonomous computer algorithm 
by putting it in control of a limited liability company. Bayern’s 
demonstration coincided with the development of “autonomous” online 
businesses that operate independently of their human owners—accepting 
payments in online currencies and contracting with human agents to 
perform the off-line aspects of their businesses.  About the same time, 
leading technologists Elon Musk, Bill Gates, and Stephen Hawking said that 
they regard human-level artificial intelligence as an existential threat to the 
human race. 
This Article argues that algorithmic entities—legal entities that 
have no human controllers—greatly exacerbate the threat of artificial 
intelligence.  Algorithmic entities are likely to prosper first and most in 
criminal, terrorist, and other anti-social activities because that is where 
they have their greatest comparative advantage over human-controlled 
entities.  Control of legal entities will contribute to the threat algorithms 
pose by providing them with identities.  Those identities will enable them to 
conceal their algorithmic natures while they participate in commerce, 
accumulate wealth, and carry out anti-social activities. 
Four aspects of corporate law make the human race vulnerable to 
the threat of algorithmic entities.  First, algorithms can lawfully have 
exclusive control of not just American LLC’s but also a large majority of 
the entity forms in most countries.  Second, entities can change regulatory 
regimes quickly and easily through migration.  Third, governments—
particularly in the United States—lack the ability to determine who controls 
the entities they charter and so cannot determine which have non-human 
controllers. Lastly, corporate charter competition, combined with ease of 
entity migration, makes it virtually impossible for any government to 
regulate algorithmic control of entities. 
 
 
*   Security Pacific Bank Distinguished Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I thank Stephen 
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Stergar, Jason Oh, James Park, Richard Re, Isaac Rottman, Jessop Stroman and participants in the UCLA 
Faculty Colloquium for comments on earlier drafts, Jessop Stroman for assistance with research, and 
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I keep sounding the alarm bell but until people see robots going down the 
street killing people, they don’t know how to react. . . . By the time we are 
reactive in AI regulation, it’s too late. . . . AI is a fundamental existential 
risk to human civilization.— Elon Musk1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1993, Yale law professor Roberta Romano characterized state 
government competition to sell corporate charters as the “genius of 
American corporate law.”2 Although that view is not without detractors,3 it 
is dominant in academia.4 In recent years, not even the competition’s 
harshest critics call for its end.5 Despite a recent corporate governance 
scandal and a financial crisis largely attributed to failures in corporate law, 
the U.S. government has allowed the competition to continue unabated. 
As this Article will show, charter competition generates systemic risk 
while impairing the political system’s ability to address the effects should 
that risk resolve unfavorably. Scholars have failed to notice because they 
assume that the competition affects only the corporation’s “internal 
affairs”—by which they mean the relationships among the corporation and 
 
 
1. CNBC, Elon Musk Issues Yet Another Warning Against Runaway Artificial Intelligence, 
YOUTUBE (July 17, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KdTTeR4TyMc. 
2. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 149 (1993) (“Competition for 
incorporation revenues makes U.S. states sensitive to investor concerns: such competition is the genius 
of American corporate law.”); id. at 148 (“[S]tate competition has produced innovative corporation 
codes that quickly respond to changing market conditions and firm demands.”). 
3. E.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Insights About C.E.O.s, Corporate Law Rules, 
and the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 625 (2002) 
(“[J]urisdictional competition for corporate charters is highly imperfect. Far from resembling textbook 
competition among rival firms, the jurisdictional competition for corporate charters is highly 
oligopolistic. One competitor, Delaware, dominates the competition.”); see generally Lynn M. LoPucki, 
Corporate Charter Competition, 102 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (arguing that the competition 
prevents corporate regulation and is beyond democratic control). 
4. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect 
Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1169 (1999) (“[S]cholars since Cary have largely 
taken a favorable view of state competition for corporate charters.”). E.g., Mitchell A. Kane & Edward 
B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1238 
n.15 (2008) (“For the purposes of this Article, we assume that charter competition leads to more valuable 
firms.”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 
72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 510 (1994) (claiming that “charter competition encourages states to regulate 
corporate law in a relatively efficient fashion” “appears to be the case”); Charlie Xiao-chuan Weng, 
Chinese Unbridled Incorporation Competition: The Reality of Political Economy and Competition for 
Corporate Charters as a Replacement, 44 HONG KONG L.J. 247, 248 (2014) (“Charter competition in 
American states is an outstanding example of a successful proactive strategy.”). 
5. E.g., Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 4, at 1199 (“This Article has sought to highlight the problems 
involved in state competition for corporate charters.”). 
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its officers, directors, and shareholders.6 If that were true, the competition 
would be of less concern because the affected parties would be volunteers.7 
But in reality, entity law does not affect merely that narrow group of 
stakeholders. It also determines who can inhabit entities, what information 
government and the public will have about them, and how effectively 
governments can police their conduct. 
Elsewhere, I have argued that charter competition’s function is to 
deregulate corporations and insulate that deregulation from democratic 
control.8 That is, in a system in which corporations do not want regulation 
at all and can choose their regulators, the race will be neither to the top nor 
the bottom. The race will be to no meaningful regulation at all.9 
Disabling regulation enables legitimate businesses. But it also enables 
everyone who uses entities, including terrorists, organized criminals, money 
launderers, corrupt public officials, and child pornographers.10 In addition, 
as this Article explores, deregulation may soon enable artificial 
intelligence—with possibly catastrophic consequences.   
In two recent articles, Professor Shawn Bayern demonstrated that anyone 
can confer legal personhood on an autonomous computer algorithm merely 
by putting it in control of a limited liability company (LLC).11 The algorithm 
can exercise the rights of the entity, making them effectively rights of the 
algorithm.  
The rights of such an algorithmic entity (AE) would include the rights to 
 
 
6. E.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 679, 681 (2002) (“[T]he legal domicile affects how corporate disputes between directors and 
shareholders are resolved—and nothing else.”); Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem 
of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 597 (2016) (“Corporate 
governance regulation concerns the balance of power between its shareholders, its officers, and its 
directors, and commonly falls within the rubric understood as the corporation’s ‘internal affairs.’ . . . 
Other forms of regulation are generally understood to be external to the corporation . . . .”). 
7. See ROMANO, supra note 2, at 85 (“The enabling approach is a function of the contractual nature 
of the corporation. Participation in a firm is voluntary . . . .”). 
8. LoPucki, supra note 3, at 4 (“My analysis concludes that the system’s principal effects are to 
deregulate corporations and shield them from the democratic re-imposition of regulation.”). 
9.  Id. 
10. See, e.g., Examining State Business Incorporation Practices: A Discussion of the Incorporation 
Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act: Hearing on S. 569 Before the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 192 (June 18, 2009) (written testimony of 
Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney for New York County, State of New York (saying in testimony 
regarding state business incorporation practices “[s]ystems promoting opacity and secrecy are the best 
friend of the money launderer, the child pornographer, the tax cheat, the fraudster, the corrupt politician, 
and indeed, the financier of networks of terror”)). 
11. Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business Entity Law for the Regulation of 
Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 104 n.43 (2015) [hereinafter Bayern, Entity Law]; 
Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1485, 1496–97 (2014) [hereinafter Bayern, Wealthy Software]. 
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privacy,12 to own property, to enter into contracts, to be represented by 
counsel, to be free from unreasonable search and seizure,13 to equal 
protection of the laws,14 to speak freely, and to spend money on political 
campaigns.15 Once an algorithm had such rights, Bayern observed, it would 
also have the power to confer equivalent rights on other algorithms by 
forming additional entities and putting those algorithms in control of them.16 
To achieve autonomy, AEs would have to be able to generate their own 
incomes. But artificial intelligence researchers may already have solved that 
problem. Currently available algorithms can defeat the best human players 
of chess, Jeopardy!,17 and Go.18 Most commentators believe that algorithms 
with the same level of technological sophistication can run profitable 
businesses. Commentators have proposed electronic data storage,19 bike 
rental,20 online gambling,21 vending machines,22 and blockchain-based 
competitors to Uber and Airbnb.23 Several start-up companies are building 
accounting tools on blockchain technology to support the anticipated 
autonomous online businesses.24 
Unfortunately, AEs’ greatest comparative advantage would be in 
criminal enterprise. Because they lack human bodies, AEs are harder to 
 
 
12. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986) (“Dow plainly has a reasonable, 
legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy within the interior of its covered buildings, and it is 
equally clear that expectation is one society is prepared to observe.”). 
13. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 44 (1906). 
14. Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (noting that the Court agreed 
that the Equal Protection Clause applied to corporations). 
15. Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
16. Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 11, at 104 (advocating a model under which “legal personhood 
is like fire: it can be granted by anyone who already has it”). 
17. E.g., John Markoff, Computer Wins on ‘Jeopardy!’: Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/science/17jeopardy-watson.html?pagewanted=all [https: 
//perma.cc/MS3W-XNGD] (describing Watson’s win over two Jeopardy! experts). 
18. E.g., Cade Metz, In a Huge Breakthrough, Google’s AI Beats a Top Player at the Game of Go, 
WIRED (Jan. 27, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/in-a-huge-breakthrough-googles-ai-
beats-a-top-player-at-the-game-of-go/ [https://perma.cc/H2VS-T5MZ].  
19. StorJ, and Bitcoin autonomous agents, RANDOM BLATHERINGS BY JEFF (Jan. 7, 2013), 
http://garzikrants.blogspot.com/2013/01/storj-and-bitcoin-autonomous-agents.html 
[https://perma.cc/2H3B-ULGH] (quoting a forum post by Gregory Maxwell (gmaxwell) describing a 
“drop-box style file service with pay per use via bitcoin”). 
20. David Z. Morris, RoboCorp, AERON ESSAYS (Jan. 25, 2015), https://aeon.co/essays/are-we-
ready-for-companies-that-run-themselves [https://perma.cc/EXV8-VVMZ] (using a hypothetical bike 
rental business as an illustration). 
21. DJ Pangburn, The Humans Who Dream of Companies That Won’t Need Us, FAST COMPANY 
(June 19, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3047462/the-humans-who-dream-of-companies-that-
wont-need-them [https://perma.cc/ZGR4-QZ74]. 
22. Bayern, Wealthy Software, supra note 11, at 1494 (using a vending machine business as an 
example). 
23. Pangburn, supra note 21. 
24. Id. (naming Ethereum, New Economy Movement, Nxt, and Mastercoin (now Omni Layer)).  
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catch and impossible to punish. AEs need not fear death or capture.25 They 
can replicate themselves without ego and sacrifice themselves without 
motive. They need not recoil at the necessity to do violence to humans.26  
In apparent recognition of these unique qualities, one commentator has 
proposed assassination brokering as a possible AE service line.27 It is not 
hard to imagine an AE—the identity and location of its autonomous 
algorithm shielded by an anonymous LLC—matching human assassins with 
customers and laundering its fees through layers of shell entities using the 
wide variety of anonymous payments systems currently in development. 
Things might get even worse. Some of the world’s wealthiest and most 
powerful people and companies are racing to create the smartest artificial 
intelligence.28 They include Google, Facebook, IBM, Elon Musk, and 
Microsoft.29 In a recent survey of one hundred seventy industry experts, the 
median expert expected human-level artificial intelligence by 204030 and 90 
percent expected it by 2075.31  
Ironically, even many of the humans who are racing to achieve super-
human intelligence expect that achievement to turn out badly for the human 
race. Tech billionaire Elon Musk said that “[w]ith artificial intelligence we 
are summoning the demon”32 and characterized it as “the most serious threat 
 
 
25. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 28 (2012), 
http:// www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf [https://perma .cc/V234-
4A7F] [hereinafter LOSING HUMANITY] (Fully autonomous weapons “would not be inhibited by the 
desire for self-preservation. They would not be influenced by emotions such as anger or fear.”). 
26. Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, 
Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 367 (2016) (“[A]n AI’s objectives are 
determined by its initial programming. Even if that initial programming permits or encourages the AI to 
alter its objectives based on subsequent experiences, those alterations will occur in accordance with the 
dictates of the initial programming.”). 
27. Morris, supra note 20 (“Bitcoin insiders . . . postulate the quite literal ‘killer app’ for 
[distributed autonomous corporations]–a distributed assassination brokerage.”); id. (“[A] spokesman for 
Ethereum . . . cited WikiLeaks as one of the best examples of a service that could benefit from operating 
as a [distributed autonomous corporation] . . . .”). 
28. Cade Metz, Google’s Go Victory is Just a Glimpse of How Powerful AI Will Be, WIRED( Jan. 
29, 2016) , https://www.wired.com/2016/01/googles-go-victory-is-just-a-glimpse-of-how-powerful-ai-
will-be/ [https://perma.cc/A9QJ-QXRC] (“The effort to create the smartest AI has truly become a race, 
and the contestants are among the most powerful and wealthy people on the planet.”); Scherer, supra 
note 26, at 374 (“The commercial potential of AI has already led to a veritable AI arms race as large 
companies have moved to invest heavily in AI projects.”). 
29. Metz, supra note 28. 
30. Vincent C. Müller & Nick Bostrom, Future Progress in Artificial Intelligence: A Survey of 
Expert Opinion, in FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 5 (Vincent C. Müller ed., 
2016). 
31.  Id. at 1. 
32. Samuel Gibbs, Elon Musk: Artificial Intelligence Is Our Biggest Existential Threat, GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 27, 2014, 6:26 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/27/elon-musk-artificial-
intelligence-ai-biggest-existential-threat [https://perma.cc/HR7Z-L449] (“I think we should be very 
careful about artificial intelligence. If I had to guess at what our biggest existential threat is, it’s probably 
that.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/7
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to the survival of the human race.”33 Bill Gates said he “agree[d] with Elon 
Musk and some others on this and [did]n’t understand why some people are 
not concerned.”34 Stephen Hawking said that “the development of full 
artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race.”35 Thirty-one 
percent of a group of artificial intelligence experts surveyed predicted that 
the development of human-level intelligence would turn out to be “bad” or 
“[e]xtremely bad” for humanity.36 Eighteen percent of those expected 
“[e]xtremely bad,” which was defined for purposes of the study as an 
“existential catastrophe.”37 
Artificial intelligence takeover is a common theme of novels and films.38 
But neither science fiction nor the academic literature has seriously 
undertaken to explain the mechanisms by which artificial intelligence would 
gain control.39 This Article begins that discussion by exploring the enabling 
role that artificial legal entities might play. Essentially, that role is to provide 
an interface between algorithms and humans that allows the algorithms to 
transact with humans at the same time that the entities shield the algorithms 
from human regulation. The effect is to confer an identity on the algorithm, 
enhance its access to legitimate commerce, and thereby increase its ability 
to inflict damage.  
Anonymity illustrates the depth of the problem. Most state governments 
sell anonymous entities.40 The assurance of anonymity is perfect. Because 
 
 
33. Id. 
34. In a Reddit post, Gates wrote: 
I am in the camp that is concerned about super intelligence. First the machines will do a lot of 
jobs for us and not be super intelligent. That should be positive if we manage it well . . . A few 
decades after that though the intelligence is strong enough to be a concern. I agree with Elon 
Musk and some others on this and don’t understand why some people are not concerned. 
Eric Mack, Bill Gates Says You Should Worry About Artificial Intelligence, FORBES, Jan. 28, 2015.  
35. Andrew Griffin, Stephen Hawking: AI Could Be the End of Humanity, INDEPENDENT, Dec. 2, 
2014. 
36. Müller & Bostrom, supra note 30, at 12. The number of respondents was 170 out of 549. Id. at 
4. 
37. Id. at 12. 
38. E.g., A.I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Warner Bros. 2001) (humans extinct and replaced by 
artificial intelligence); THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999) (artificial intelligence keeps humans in coffin-
size pods); THE TERMINATOR (Hemdale 1984) (artificial intelligence called Skynet threatens nuclear 
holocaust); Jack Williamson, With Folded Hands . . . , ASTOUNDING SCIENCE FICTION, July 1947, at 6 
(artificial intelligence lobotomizes humans to make them happy). 
39. But see The Animatrix, WIKIPEDIA https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Animatrix#.22The_S 
econd_Renaissance_Part_I.22 [https://perma.cc/GG4N-UUZR] (last visited Oct. 10, 2017) (“The 
surviving robots leave in a mass exodus with the aid of their human allies and build their own new nation 
in central Saudi Arabia (according to narration, ‘the cradle of civilization’).”). 
40. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-376, COMPANY FORMATIONS: MINIMAL 
OWNERSHIP INFORMATION IS COLLECTED AND AVAILABLE 13 (2006) (“Most states do not require 
ownership information at the time a company is formed, and while most states require corporations and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the charter-issuing governments do not obtain the purchasers’ identities, 
those governments cannot reveal them, even to police and prosecutors. 
Buyers can use these anonymous entities to operate businesses or hold 
property anonymously almost anywhere in the world. In some U.S. markets, 
anonymous LLC ownership of expensive housing has become the norm,41 
and anonymous LLCs sometimes flaunt their ability to disregard the law.42  
The largest and most powerful countries, including the United States, 
have agreed that the sale of anonymous entities should end. As members of 
the Financial Action Task Force, the United States and thirty-six other 
nations have agreed that, to combat terrorism, crime, and money laundering, 
“[c]ountries should ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely 
information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons that 
can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities.”43 
But even in such compelling circumstances, neither the United States nor 
most of the other concurring nations have been able to enact legislation 
requiring even the first step in that process: self-identification of the humans 
who control each entity. Legislation that would require that step has been 
pending in the United States Congress for nine years. That legislation does 
not require that the controllers provide any documentary proof of their 
claimed identities, that the government make any effort to determine 
whether the documents are genuine, or that any information be made public. 
Despite its timidity, the legislation is given little chance of passage.44  
Instead, the entity system is racing in the opposite direction.45 
Governments are locked in a competition to make the entities they sell more 
attractive to potential buyers, and that competition is spreading throughout 
the world.46 Nearly all competing governments pursue the same strategy: 
impose less regulation and confer more benefits on the entity’s owners and 
controllers. 
 
 
LLCs to file annual or biennial reports, few states require ownership information on these reports.”). 
41. Louise Story, A Mansion, a Shell Company and Resentment in Bel Air, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
2015 (“Shell companies were used in three-quarters of purchases of over $5 million in Los Angeles over 
the last three years, a higher rate even than the roughly 55 percent in New York . . . .”). 
42. Id. (describing an anonymous LLC’s construction of a $100 million home in blatant violation 
of numerous building regulations). 
43. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, 
22 (FEB. 2012) (last updated Oct. 2016), www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fa 
tf/.../recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf [hereinafter FATF RECOMMENDATIONS] 
(recommendation 24). 
44. See infra note 315 and accompanying text. 
45. E.g., Federico M. Mucciarelli, The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of 
Reincorporations in the U.S. and the EU, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 421, 467 (2012) (“EU law is the 
driver of the evolution of Member States’ laws toward a more liberal approach to corporate mobility.”). 
46. See, e.g., Weng, supra note 4 (advocating charter competition for China). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/7
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Three fundamental principles frame that competition. First, an entity can 
incorporate anywhere, regardless of the location of its operations. Second, 
an entity chartered in one jurisdiction can do business in virtually any other 
jurisdiction.47 Third, while operating in those other jurisdictions, the entity 
continues to be governed by the entity law under which it was formed.48 
Those principles are deeply embedded, not only in laws, constitutions, and 
treaties, but also in physical systems and business operations, throughout 
the world.49 The effect is that almost regardless of where it will operate, an 
entity can choose the law that will regulate it from among the entity laws of 
nearly the entire world.50 
Chartering artificial entities is a highly profitable business. Virtually 
every government sells charters, and hundreds of governments at the 
national or local level actively compete for the sales in a multi-billion dollar 
market.51 Many of the competing governments are in small states or 
countries where the revenues from entity sales provide a substantial portion 
of all government revenues.52 For example, in 2005, more than a quarter of 
Delaware’s revenues were from entity sales.53 Ending the competition might 
 
 
47. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459; Scott 
FitzGibbon & Donald W. Glazer, Legal Opinions on Incorporation, Good Standing, and Qualification 
to Do Business, 41 BUS. LAW. 461, 479 (1986) (“Qualification usually can be accomplished by simply 
filing and paying a fee.”). 
48. Mucciarelli, supra note 45, at 465 (“Indeed, as a basic principle, employee participation is 
governed by the law of the state where the registered office is located after the reincorporation by way 
of cross-border merger.”); e.g., Directive 2007/36, art. 1, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 July 2007 on the Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies, 2007 O.J. (L 
184) 17 (“The Member State competent to regulate matters covered in this Directive shall be the Member 
State in which the company has its registered office, and references to the ‘applicable law’ are references 
to the law of that Member State.”). 
49. The principles to which I refer are system principles.  They transcend legal principles. 
[Legal] systems operate according to basic principles that are few in number and remain stable 
over time. Participants in the systems may or may not be conscious of the principles they 
follow. Sometimes the principles will be expressed in maxims, adages, or black letter rules of 
law. But just as often they are so deeply embedded in the systems and the minds of participants 
that they go virtually unnoticed. 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1996). 
50. See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 2, at 1 (“Firms . . . can . . . seek the state whose code best 
matches their needs.”). 
51. Comprehensive data are not available on either the number of entities existing or the 
government revenues generated. EconStats provides data from 2005 on seventy countries that account 
for more than 42 million incorporations. ECONSTATS, http://www.econstats.com/wdi/wdiv_494.htm 
[http://perma.cc/X4NU-JP75]. I derived this figure by totaling the numbers reported on the spreadsheet 
for that year. 
52. ROMANO, supra note 2, at 121 (“Franchise fee revenues are an insignificant percentage of a 
national government’s budget. Hence, such a government is far less motivated than a small state, such 
as Delaware, to be responsive to firms.”). 
53. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING 
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 53 (2005) (stating that corporate filing fees and franchise taxes were 27 
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have serious fiscal consequences for some of those governments. The 
competing governments consistently resist reform. 
Reform of the entity system will also meet resistance from at least three 
other sources. First, as the release of the Panama Papers showed, a ban on 
anonymous entities would adversely affect the interests of tax evaders, 
terrorists, corrupt public officials, drug cartels, money launderers, and other 
criminals.54 These entities will exercise their considerable influence in 
opposition. Second, privacy advocates oppose disclosure of the human 
owners’ and controllers’ identities, even to the government.55 Third, 
ideological support for “regulatory competition” in the entity market is 
strong. As a Delaware official argued in opposition to entity disclosure, “We 
have a system that is the greatest creator of wealth in the history of the 
world. We will not support any changes that change the friendliness of 
American business and close our doors to capital formation and the ease of 
doing business.”56 Given the forces in opposition, reform of the entity 
chartering system seems unlikely.  
Part I of this Article considers how and why humans might create AEs 
and exclude themselves from control of their creations. Section A explains 
how algorithms can inhabit entities. Section B explores the motives that 
might drive humans to initiate AEs. Section C explains why AEs are a 
greater threat than algorithms operating without entities. Part II explores 
three challenges to the ability of humans to maintain control over AEs. 
Section A demonstrates the ability of AEs to inhabit nearly any entity type. 
Section B does the same with respect to AE mobility across entity types and 
jurisdictional borders. Section C explains the difficulty of detecting AEs in 
the present, low-disclosure legal environment. Part III describes the changes 
in the international entity system that would be necessary to regulate AEs, 
explains the difficulty of making those changes, and speculates on the role 
that AEs themselves might play in opposition. Part IV concludes that 
effective reform requires that governments end the competition to sell 
 
 
percent of Delaware’s budget in 2004). 
54. Giant Leak of Offshore Financial Records Exposes Global Array of Crime and Corruption, 
Int’l Consortium of Investigative Journalists (Apr. 3, 2016), https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160403-
panama-papers-global-overview.html [http://perma.cc/KS86-59F8]. 
55. See, e.g., Shelby Emmett, Beneficial Ownership Disclosure: A Huge Donor Disclosure Threat, 
AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.alec.org/article 
/beneficial-ownership-disclosure-a-huge-donor-disclosure-threat/ (“In the name of fighting terrorists 
and criminals these bills will expose millions of law abiding individuals to a massive government data 
collection that undermines their personal privacy and that of anyone even loosely connected to an entity 
they create.”).  
56. Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven .html 
[https://perma.cc/V4ZZ-BSTY]. 
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charters. Absent such drastic reform, the entity system may vastly multiply 
the risk of existential catastrophe posed by artificial intelligence.  
I. THE NATURE OF ALGORITHMIC ENTITIES 
A legal entity is anyone or anything the law recognizes as a legal actor. 
In addition to human beings, entities include corporations, partnerships, 
limited liability companies (LLCs), trusts, estates, government agencies, 
and many other types. Entities do not include ships,57 animals,58 trees,59 
trademarks,60 or corporate groups,61 to name just a few. Entities can own 
property, enter into contracts, sue, and be sued. 
An entity is “algorithmic” if an algorithm controls it. An algorithm is a 
set of decision-making rules. The relevant algorithms run on computers. 
They are programs—artificial intelligences—that make and execute 
decisions in response to external circumstances. Algorithms are not entities; 
they are property. 
For the purposes of this Article, an algorithm controls an entity only if 
the algorithm makes the entity’s decisions without human participation. 
That a human created the algorithm does not disqualify the algorithm from 
status as a controller, provided that the human no longer has the ability to 
modify the algorithm. 
An entity is “autonomous” if the entity controls itself, as opposed to 
being controlled by owners or members. All algorithmic entities are 
autonomous by definition. But not all autonomous entities are algorithmic. 
For example, a nonprofit corporation may have no shareholders or 
members.62 The members of the board of directors make decisions for such 
 
 
57. Michal Chwedczuk, Analysis of the Legal Status of Unmanned Commercial Vessels in U.S. 
Admiralty and Maritime Law, 47 J. MAR. L. & COM. 123, 163 (2016) (arguing that the law should grant 
personhood to unmanned vessels directed by artificial intelligence). 
58. E.g., People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249–50 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2014) (“Not surprisingly, animals have never been considered persons for the purposes of 
habeas corpus relief, nor have they been explicitly considered as persons or entities capable of asserting 
rights for the purpose of state or federal law.”). 
59. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural 
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 487 (1972). 
60. Lynn M. LoPucki, Toward A Trademark-Based Liability System, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1099, 1100 
(2002) (“[L]iability law recognizes no entity or actor corresponding to Mobil, Honeywell, or Price 
Waterhouse.”). 
61. Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 
SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 885 (2012) (“In the United States, however, there is no entity form 
corresponding to the corporate group . . . .”). 
62. E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 5310 (2014) (providing, with respect to nonprofit public benefit 
corporations that a corporation “may admit persons to membership, as provided in its articles or bylaws, 
or may provide in its articles or bylaws that it shall have no members”). 
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an entity, including the selection of board members.63 Because the board is 
autonomous and regarded as the physical manifestation of the entity, the 
entity is regarded as autonomous.64 This Article addresses only entities that 
are both autonomous and algorithmic.  
Intelligence is the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills. 
Artificial intelligence is a computer program—an algorithm—that has those 
abilities. Although such a program is capable of gathering information and 
making decisions, the law regards it as mere property. Because it lacks the 
status of legal actor, the algorithm can neither own property nor legally bind 
humans to carry out its decisions. Only entities can do those things. 
A. Linking Algorithms and Entities 
Although an algorithm has no rights of its own, Bayern has shown that 
by giving an algorithm control of a legal entity, an initiator can confer on 
the algorithm the ability to exercise the entity’s rights.65 Because those legal 
rights are the rights of “persons,” Bayern argues that such a link confers 
“personhood” on the algorithm.66 
Bayern asserts that the New York Limited Liability Company Act67 and 
the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA)68 permit LLCs to 
exist without members. His assertion is questionable with respect to both 
statutes.69 But Bayern does specify at least one chain of events that is 
capable of establishing AEs under those statutes:  
The proposed technique is as follows: (1) Existing person P 
establishes member-managed LLCs A and B, with identical operating 
agreements both providing that the entity is controlled by an 
 
 
63. Id. (“In the case of a corporation which has no members, any action . . . which would otherwise 
require . . . approval by the members . . . shall require only approval of the board . . . .”). 
64. E.g., Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 2003) (stating that non-profit 
organizations “are autonomous agents that should control their own destiny”). 
65. Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 11, at 101–04 (using the example of an LLC). 
66. Id. at 104 (“The end result is novel legal personhood—or at least a functional analogue of it—
without any ongoing commitment by, or subservience to, a preexisting person.”). 
67. Id. at 103–04. 
68. Id. at 102. 
69. See Matthew Scherer, Is AI Personhood Already Possible Under U.S. LLC Laws? (Part One: 
New York), LAW AND AI (May 14, 2017), http://www.lawandai.com/2017/05/14/is-ai- personhood-
already-possible-under-current-u-s-laws-dont-count-on-it-part-one/[http://perma.cc/YFA4-5SPD] 
[hereinafter Scherer, Part One] (arguing that memberless LLCs can exist only for brief periods under 
New York law) ); Mathew Scherer, Is AI Personhood Already Possible Under U.S. LLC Laws? (Part 
Two: Uniform LLC Act), LAW AND AI (May 21, 2017), http://www.lawandai.com/2017/05/21/is-ai-
personhood-already-possible-under-current-u-s-laws-part-two-uniform-llc-act/ [http://perma.cc/M6BK 
-UMAM] [hereinafter Scherer, Part Two] (arguing that memberless LLCs can exist only for brief periods 
under the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/7
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autonomous system that is not a preexisting legal person; (2) P causes 
A to be admitted as a member of B and B to be admitted as a member 
of A; (3) P withdraws from both entities. The result does not trigger 
the law’s response to memberless entities, because what remains are 
simply two entities with one member each.70 
The entity pair thus formed will be referred to in this Article as an AE 
“dyad.” 
Once formed, AEs would not be confined to cyberspace. An AE could 
act offline by contracting online with humans or robots for offline services. 
Bayern uses an algorithm that operates a Bitcoin vending machine business 
to illustrate: 
Someone needs to install the vending machines and continuously 
supply them. But from the perspective of the software operating the 
network, those tasks are simply another type of input to production, 
like disk space or network bandwidth. The software can pay someone 
to install or stock a new vending machine, verify that the task has 
been completed, and remit payment digitally using Bitcoin.71 
The essential elements of a business conducted by an algorithm through 
an entity are the entity, the algorithm, the computer to run it on, the internet 
access, and the ability to pay for those things. Once those elements are in 
place, an entity controlled by an algorithm might be virtually 
indistinguishable from one controlled by humans. Either kind of entity 
could contract for the services of human agents and employees. Those 
agents and employees could open bank accounts, conduct interviews, meet 
with customers, appear in court on the entity’s behalf, and do anything else 
that might be necessary. Once an AE is up and running, profits might 
provide the money necessary to continue. The AE would then be not only 
autonomous, but also self-sufficient.  
B. Initiating Algorithmic Entities 
A simple algorithm might be sufficient to run a simple business, such as 
Bayern’s vending machine operator. That algorithm could run on a 
computer that cost only a few hundred dollars. Such a business might 
generate sufficient revenues to become self-supporting in a matter of 
months and then run for many years. But the duration of its operation would 
 
 
70. Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 11, at 104 n.43. 
71. Bayern, Wealthy Software, supra note 11, at 1494. 
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be limited by the algorithm’s inability to adapt to changing circumstances. 
An algorithm sufficiently sophisticated to run a complex business and 
adapt to changing circumstances would cost more. IBM developed Watson, 
an artificial intelligence program that might have such capabilities, at an 
estimated cost of $900 million to $1.8 billion. 72 An AE initiator would not 
have to incur costs of that magnitude. The AE would require only a copy of 
the software and the programming services necessary to modify its 
objectives. A supercomputer capable of running a modified copy of Watson 
may cost $500,000 to $1 million. Even if those costs are currently 
prohibitive, they are likely to decline over time, even as the capabilities of 
the hardware and software increase. 
By definition, the initiator of an AE would neither own the entity nor 
control it after launch. The initiator would, however, have the opportunity 
to set the algorithm’s objectives prior to launch. Initiators might be willing 
to contribute the funds necessary to launch AEs for a variety of reasons. 
1. Terrorism. An initiator could program an AE to raise money to finance 
terrorism or to directly engage in terrorist acts. It could be programmed for 
genocide or general mayhem. 
2. Benefits. An initiator could program an AE to provide direct benefits 
to individuals, groups, or causes. For example, an AE might pay excess 
funds to the initiator or to someone on whom the initiator chose to confer 
that benefit. The benefits conferred could be indirect. For example, an AE 
might promote or consume the initiator’s products,73 harass the initiator’s 
opponents, manipulate securities prices, or provide positive or negative 
reviews on the internet.  
3. Impact. An initiator could program an AE to achieve some specified 
impact on the world. The goals might range all of the way from traditional 
philanthropy to pure maliciousness. Philanthropic AEs might provide a 
more trustworthy alternative to traditional charities and foundations, which 
often fail to carry out donors’ instructions.74 Alternatively, decedents might 
choose to entrust AEs to apply their wealth to any purpose whatsoever—
 
 
72.   5 billion-dollar tech gambles, CNN MONEY http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2010/technolo 
gy/1008/gallery.biggest_tech_gambles/3.html, Aug. 26, 2010. 
73.   AEs might, for example, become independent franchisees. 
74.   Frances H. Foster, Donor-Centered Philanthropy (unpublished manuscript 2017) (providing 
examples); Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs. Donor 
Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2005) (“The cat is out of the bag: Donors are fast 
discovering what was once a well-kept secret in the philanthropic sector—that a gift to public charity 
donated for a specific purpose and restricted to that purpose is often used by the charity for its general 
operations or applied to other uses not intended by the donor.”). See generally CONTEMPORARY TRUSTS 
AND ESTATES 816–48 (Susan Gary et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017) (providing an extended discussion of cases 
“involv[ing] donor intent and the alleged failure by the charity to carry out that intent,” including the 
high-profile Buck Trust, Barnes, Smithers, Hardt, Robertson, and Helmsley Trust cases). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/7
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including manipulation of their descendants in ways not permitted by law, 
the expression of their political views or racial prejudices, magnifying the 
decedents’ places in history, or supporting causes so unpopular that the 
inheritance system would not tolerate them.  
4. Curiosity. An initiator might launch an AE simply out of curiosity. 
Initiators have sometimes devoted substantial time and money to launch 
computer viruses from which they could derive no monetary benefit. 
Initiators might seek the knowledge or fame that a successful AE could 
generate. 
5. Liability avoidance. Initiators can limit their civil and criminal liability 
for acts of their algorithms by transferring the algorithms to entities and 
surrendering control at the time of the launch.75 For example, the initiator 
might specify a general goal, such as maximizing financial return, and leave 
it to the algorithm to decide how to do that. If the algorithm later directed 
the commission of a crime, prosecutors may be unable to prove the intent 
necessary to convict the initiator of that crime (as opposed to the lesser 
charge of reckless initiation). Because intelligent agents act and interact in 
unpredictable ways, most commentators conclude that there is a substantial 
class of cases in which the initiators of intelligent agents will not be held 
responsible for the agent’s actions. This conclusion is accepted in the 
literature and referred to as the “accountability gap.”76 Together, these five 
motivations assure that once the necessary hardware and software are 
available, humans will launch AEs. 
C. The Threat from Algorithm Plus Entity 
Algorithmic control of a legal entity—exclusive of human control—is 
the essence of an AE. Much of the danger results from that combination. 
Neither an entityless algorithm nor a human-controlled algorithm presents 
nearly so great a threat. Control of entities would allow algorithms to 
accumulate wealth, leverage it in capital markets, and participate in the 
 
 
75. The ability to do so may vary significantly by jurisdiction. For example, the German limited 
liability act provides: 
Shareholders who intentionally or gross negligently leave a person who may not act as director 
to manage the company’s business shall be held severally and jointly liable to the company for 
that damage which arises on account of the fact that this person violates the obligations which 
he is under vis-à-vis the company. 
See, e.g., Limited Liability Companies Act § 6(5). 
76. E.g., Bert-Jaap Koops et al., Bridging the Accountability Gap: Rights for New Entities in the 
Information Society?, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 497, 560–61 (2010) (“The majority view in the 
literature is that sooner or later, limited legal personhood with strict liability is a good solution for solving 
the accountability gap.”).  
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political process—without being subject to the constraints under which 
humans operate. 
1. The Entity’s Contribution 
Algorithms that do not control entities are capable of inflicting massive 
damage on social and economic systems. They could shut down human 
computing, steal and release confidential information, and wreak havoc by 
seizing control of the internet of things. 
What they cannot do without controlling entities is to participate 
effectively in legitimate economic and political activity.77 That is, an 
algorithm alone could not engage in business, accumulate wealth, or deal 
with people in the above-ground economy. 
Consider, for example, an algorithm that seeks to accumulate resources 
by encrypting humans’ data and offering to decrypt it in return for ransom 
payments. The algorithm may not need an entity to commit the crime, or 
even to receive the payment in bitcoin.78 But an algorithm alone could not 
use the proceeds to buy or lease real property, contract with legitimate 
businesses, open a bank account, sue to enforce its rights, or buy stuff on 
Amazon and have it shipped. To do any of those things, the algorithm would 
need an identity. 
Algorithms could use fake human identities. But creating a fake human 
identity requires criminal and fraudulent acts. Because a fake human 
identity asserts the existence of a human who does not exist or claims the 
identity of a human who does exist, a fake human identity could never be 
safe from discovery. As a consequence, the algorithm could not fully rely 
on it. Nor could a fake human identity be credible in the business world 
without the same human’s personal appearances over time.  
By contrast, an algorithm could generate any number of artificial entities 
quickly and easily, without violating any law. The entities can function as 
the algorithm’s identities, just as entities do for other kinds of criminals.79 
Artificial entities can more easily generate credibility because they are a 
form with which business people are already familiar. Artificial entities can 
make their “personal” appearances through a changing array of humans 
because such changes commonly occur in business entities. 
Transactions in the criminal underworld are complicated, risky, and 
 
 
77. I am indebted to Jason Oh for raising the issue addressed in this section. 
78. See CYBER THREAT ALLIANCE, LUCRATIVE RANSOMWARE ATTACKS: ANALYSIS OF THE 
CRYPTOWALL VERSION 3 THREAT (2015) (describing successful ransomware with payment through 
bitcoin). 
79. Shima Baradaran et al., Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 492 (2014) (“[Shell 
companies] obscure true beneficial ownership to the detriment of law enforcement worldwide.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/7
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inefficient. Like other criminals, criminal algorithms will want access to the 
safety and efficiency of the legitimate business world. Money laundering is 
the link between those two worlds,80 and entities are an essential money 
laundering tool.81 Like other criminals without entities, algorithms without 
entities would be confined to the underworld, unable to apply their wealth 
effectively. Allowing algorithms to control entities is particularly dangerous 
to society because governments lack the power to meaningfully regulate 
entities.82 
2. The Human-Exclusion Contribution 
Bayern saw “few systematic downsides, in permitting memberless 
entities that a nonhuman system might ‘inhabit’ and use as an interface to 
the rest of private law.”83 He advocated “experimentation” without prior 
regulation.84 The essence of his argument was that putting an algorithm in 
control of an entity did not enable the algorithm to do anything it could not 
do “with a single willing collaborator that is already a legal person.”85 To 
put his argument another way, most artificial intelligence algorithms are 
already owned by artificial entities.86 Those entities have all of the rights 
and abilities that will accrue to AEs. The humans in control of those entities 
can give their algorithms as much control as they choose. If the humans cede 
all control, the entities are indistinguishable from AEs. Thus, Bayern 
concludes, allowing AEs adds nothing to the risks from artificial 
intelligence. 
To the contrary, the risk to humanity from AEs is greater than the risk 
from algorithms with human collaborators for at least three reasons. Entities 
without human collaborators could be more ruthless, more difficult to deter, 
 
 
80. Id. at 488 (“Money laundering is a multi-layered process by which terrorists hide the illegal 
source or use of income and then disguise that income to make it appear legitimate.”). 
81. Id. (“Shell companies are important to [the layering] stage of the [money laundering] process 
because the layering transactions involve moving funds to supposedly legitimate companies.”). 
82. See generally LoPucki, supra note 3 (arguing that charter competition prevents regulation). 
83. Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 11, at 109. 
84. Id. at 110 (“[T]here are several advantages to permitting at least experimentation with 
autonomous entities. The alternatives are either too slow (direct regulation by statute) or too restrictive 
(no recognition at all).”). 
85. Id. at 109 (“[T]he legal techniques I am describing provide little new functional capabilities; 
autonomous systems already can do quite a lot, legally, with a single willing collaborator that is already 
a legal person.”); id. at 107 (“Any autonomous system that desires (if it is sufficiently advanced to 
experience desire)—or for which others desire—legal personhood can approximate its capabilities with 
any willing human collaborator (or indeed any existing legal person that is willing).”). 
86. Watson, for example, is owned by IBM Corporation. See supra note 72 and accompanying 
text. 
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and easier to replicate.  
a. Ruthlessness 
Unless explicitly or implicitly programmed to have them, AEs will lack 
sympathy and empathy. Even if the AEs are fully capable of understanding 
the effects of their actions on humans, they may be indifferent to those 
effects. As a result, AEs will have a wider range of options available to them 
than would be available to even the most morally lax human controller. An 
AE could pursue its goals with utter ruthlessness. Virtually any human 
controller would stop somewhere short of that, making the AE more 
dangerous. 
b. Lack of Deterrability 
Outsiders can more easily deter a human-controlled entity than an AE. 
For example, if a human-controlled entity attempts to pursue an illegal 
course of action, the government can threaten to incarcerate the human 
controller. If the course of action is merely abhorrent, colleagues, friends, 
and relatives could apply social pressures. AEs lack those vulnerabilities 
because no human associated with them has control. As a result, AEs have 
greater freedom to pursue unpopular goals using unpopular methods.  
In deciding to attempt a coup, bomb a restaurant, or assemble an armed 
group to attack a shopping center, a human-controlled entity puts the lives 
of its human controllers at risk. The same decisions on behalf of an AE risk 
nothing but the resources the AE spends in planning and execution. If an 
AE cares at all about self-preservation, it will be only as a means of 
achieving some other goal for which it has been programmed.87 Deterrence 
of an AE from its goals, as distinguished from particular means of achieving 
them, is impossible.  
c. Replication 
AEs can replicate themselves quickly and easily. If an AE’s operations 
are entirely online, replication may be as easy as forming a new entity and 
electronically copying an algorithm. An entity can be formed in some 
 
 
87. See, e.g., MURRAY SHANAHAN, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SINGULARITY 145–46 (2015); id. at 146 
(“[I]f the AI’s reward function involves maximizing widget production, then the optimal strategy might 
be to commission a widget factor and then self-destruct.”); Ben Goertzel, Superintelligence: Fears, 
Promises and Potentials, 24 J. EVOLUTION & TECH. 55 (2015) (“It may well be that “self-preservation” 
is an anthropomorphic or biomorphic idea, and very advanced AGI systems might go far beyond such 
notions.”). 
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jurisdictions in as little as an hour and for as little as seventy dollars.88 
(While entities are not, strictly speaking, copies of other entities, they can 
be identical to other entities, which has the same effect.)  
Easy replication supports several possible strategies. First, replication in 
a destination jurisdiction followed by dissolution of the entity in the original 
jurisdiction may put the AE beyond the legal reach of the original 
jurisdiction.89 For a human-controlled entity to escape the reach of the 
original jurisdiction, the human would have to move physically to the 
destination jurisdiction. 
 Second, replication can make an AE harder to destroy. For example, if 
copies of an AE exist in three jurisdictions, each is a person with its own 
rights. A court order revoking the charter of one or seizing the assets of 
another would have no effect on the third. It could continue to exist and 
replicate further. The strategy does not work as well for a human-controlled 
entity. To replicate a human-controlled entity, one must either recruit 
additional humans to control the copies or put the same human in control of 
the copies. The former is time consuming because it requires a personnel 
search. It is complex because each human must be appropriately motivated. 
It is risky because every person is different and difficult to assess. The latter 
leaves the same person in control of all the entities, providing the basis for 
a court to disregard their separate existences. In short, algorithms can be 
almost instantly cloned; humans cannot. 
Third, replication can operate as a method of hedging. Consider, for 
example, the hypothetical situation in which ten jurisdictions are 
considering a ban on AEs and the ban has a ninety percent chance of 
adoption in each. An AE that replicated itself in each of the ten jurisdictions 
would expect to survive in one.  
Fourth, because they know what each other will do,90 replications may 
be able to cooperate for mutual benefit without the necessity for agreement 
or collusion. Ants and bees are biological examples of organisms in which 
replications cooperate.91 
 
 
88. Arizona Corporation Commission, Corporations Division Fee Schedule – Limited Liability 
Companies, http://www.azcc.gov/Divisions/Corporations/Fee-Schedule-LLCs.pdf (showing “total fee 
for regular processing” as $50 for LLC Articles of Organization); State of Delaware: The Official 
Website of the First State, https://corp.delaware.gov/expserv.shtml (offering one-hour incorporation for 
$1,000). 
89. This strategy is the subject of Part II.B below. 
90. By definition, each replication contains the same code. A replication can predict the actions of 
another by examining its own code. 
91. Aviram Gelblum et al., Ant Groups Optimally Amplify the Effect of Transiently Informed 
Individuals, NATURE COMMUNICATIONS (July 28, 2015), https://www.nature.com/articles/n 
comms8729 [https://perma.cc/7KPM-Y36E]. 
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Because they can act ruthlessly, cannot be deterred, and can replicate 
easily, AEs are more dangerous than algorithms that aid human-controlled 
entities. The issue is not whether humans should allow experimentation with 
AEs. They should not. The issue is whether humans can prevent AEs. That 
is the subject of the next Part.  
II. THE CHALLENGE OF MAINTAINING HUMAN CONTROL  
This Part argues that current law provides no effective mechanisms for 
preventing the formation of algorithmic entities or controlling them once 
they exist. First, initiators could put algorithms in control of most types of 
artificial entities without violating any law. As the entity system currently 
operates, initiators—and AEs once they are formed—can choose among 
thousands of entity types made available by hundreds of states and 
countries. Second, if threatened by proposed changes in their governing 
legal regimes, algorithms could change legal regimes by migrating across 
borders or changing entity types. They could do so without changing the 
locations of their physical operations. Third, in most jurisdictions, the law 
does not require that entities reveal their beneficial owners or controllers, 
making it difficult, if not impossible, for enforcement agencies to identify 
those whose controllers are not human. Each of these three points is 
addressed in a separate section. 
A. The Dispersion Problem 
AEs will be difficult for humans to control because they can disperse 
among virtually any type of entity, domestic or foreign. Although American 
LLC statutes contemplate that the entity will have at least one member,92 
that member can be an LLC or other artificial person.93 As Bayern noted, a 
dyad consisting of two LLCs that are the sole members of each other satisfy 
that requirement.94 Thus, formation of AEs is probably possible under the 
LLC statutes of all, or nearly all, U.S. jurisdictions. As shown in this section, 
the formation of AEs is probably possible under the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, the Model Business Corporation Act, the Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act, the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and 
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. Those statutes govern the four 
 
 
92. See, e.g., Scherer, Part One and Scherer, Part Two, supra note 69. 
93. E.g., ULLCA § 102(11) (defining a member as a person who has become a member); ULLCA 
§ 102(15) (defining a person to include artificial entities); 18 DEL. CODE §101(11) (defining a member 
as a person who has become a member); 18 DEL. CODE §101(12) (defining a person to include artificial 
entities). 
94. Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 11, at 104 n.43. 
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business entity types most common under the laws of U.S. jurisdictions. 
1. Delaware Corporations 
Bayern considered it “impossible to create an autonomous corporation” 
because corporation statutes require that corporations be governed by 
boards of directors populated by “natural persons.”95 The requirement that 
a Delaware corporation be managed by a board of directors composed of 
natural persons is, however, merely a default rule. Delaware General 
Corporation Law (DGCL) § 141(a) provides that “the business and affairs 
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise 
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”96 Scholars 
have interpreted this provision as “allow[ing] corporations to modify the 
role of the board of directors, including not having a board.” 97 To verify the 
lack of need for a director who is a natural person, I formed a Delaware 
corporation, BA 230 Corporation, with this provision in its certificate of 
incorporation: “Pursuant to Delaware General Corporation Law § 141(a), 
this corporation shall not have a board of directors, but shall instead be 
managed by BA 230 LLC.”98 From the language of the statute, the opinions 
of other scholars, and the grant of BA 230 Corporation’s charter by the 
Delaware Secretary of State, I conclude that Delaware law does not require 
that a natural person participate in the management of a Delaware 
corporation. An artificial person can manage a Delaware corporation. As a 
result, AEs can be constructed in a variety of ways, using only the corporate 
form.  
One way would be to create a corporate dyad. The certificates of 
 
 
95. Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 11, at 98 (“Clearly, of course, this requirement makes it 
impossible to create an autonomous corporation—that is, one that does not require an ongoing 
association with any natural persons.”). 
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2016) (emphasis added). 
97. Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate 
Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1057 n.22 (2014); see also Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, 
Larry from the Left: An Appreciation, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 121, 129 (2014) (“Thus the board—the 
central feature of corporate governance—appears to be merely a default rule.”); Grant M. Hayden & 
Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. 
L. REV. 1127, 1135 (2011) (“Thus the board—the central feature of corporate governance—appears to 
be merely a default rule.”); Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on 
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 669 (2003) 
(“Delaware law . . . treats board governance as a default rule that can be ‘bargained around’ in the 
corporate charter.”). 
98.BA 230 CORPORATION, CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION (2016), http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu 
/BA230.pdf. 
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incorporation of Parent Corporation and Subsidiary Corporation would 
provide for reciprocal management. That is, Parent Corporation’s business 
and affairs would be managed by Subsidiary Corporation and Subsidiary 
Corporation’s business and affairs would be managed by Parent 
Corporation. Subsidiary Corporation would issue all of its shares to Parent 
Corporation. Nothing in the DGCL requires that a corporation issue 
shares,99 and Parent Corporation would not issue any. Neither corporation 
would have a board of directors. The same algorithm would manage both 
corporations, and both would qualify under my definition of an AE.100 
Third parties transacting with Subsidiary Corporation might have two 
concerns about Parent Corporation’s failure to issue shares. First, by having 
no stockholders, Parent Corporation might be in violation of DGCL 
§ 211(b)’s mandate that “an annual meeting of stockholders shall be held 
for the election of directors on a date and at a time designated by or in the 
manner provide in the bylaws.” Such a meeting is unnecessary because 
Subsidiary Corporation has no board of directors and so cannot elect 
directors to it. Even if the court were to read the statute as requiring an 
annual meeting nevertheless, DGCL § 211(b) provides that failure to hold a 
required meeting of shareholders “shall not affect otherwise valid corporate 
acts or work a forfeiture or dissolution of the corporation.” The transaction 
between Subsidiary Corporation and the third party would be an otherwise 
valid corporate act. 
A few courts have held that a corporation’s initiators may own it even in 
the absence of stock issuance.101 Thus, Parent Corporation’s initiator—or 
that initiator’s successors in interest—might later seek to force issuance of 
Parent Corporation’s shares to themselves as a means of removing the 
algorithm from control. To prevent initiators, their creditors, courts, or 
intermeddlers from doing so, the initiator could itself be an artificial entity. 
Upon initiation, the initiator could renounce any residual ownership of the 
corporation, transfer its remaining rights to the AE, and dissolve. No entity 
with a claim to the shares would remain. This device would also protect the 
initiator from liability for failure to exercise control in the period after 
initiation. 
 
 
99.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 151(a) (2017) states that “[e]very corporation may issue 1 or more 
classes of stock . . . .” (emphasis added). 8 DEL. CODE § 274 specifically contemplates that a corporation 
may commence business without having issued shares: “[I]f the corporation has begun business but it 
has not issued shares, all debts of the corporation have been paid . . . .” 
100. See supra Part I. 
101. For example, the court in Castiel v. Hegenbarth, 539 So. 2d 931, 934 (La. Ct. App. 1989) held 
that “actual ownership of a corporation may be determined from all the facts in a case when stock 
certificates are not issued.” But a corporate initiator that renounced ownership and dissolved could not 
later claim ownership, even under those authorities. See id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/7
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Subsidiary Corporation would have the full range of powers and abilities 
of a Delaware corporation. In particular, it could transact outside the 
ordinary course of its business by merging with other corporations or selling 
its assets. As a condition of such contracting, third parties customarily 
require opinion letters from corporate counsel stating, among other things, 
that the corporation took all action necessary to authorize the transaction. 
Subsidiary Corporation’s counsel will require documentary evidence before 
issuing the opinion. Subsidiary Corporation could provide such evidence by 
furnishing Subsidiary Corporation’s certificate of incorporation, Parent 
Corporation’s written consent as manager to the issuance of all of 
Subsidiary Corporation’s shares to Parent Corporation, and Parent 
Corporation’s written consent as shareholder to Subsidiary Corporation’s 
transaction. The provision in Subsidiary Corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation authorizing Parent to manage Subsidiary in lieu of a board 
would explain the absence of a Subsidiary Corporation directors’ resolution. 
Parent Corporation’s written consent as manager would prove that Parent 
Corporation, as Subsidiary’s manager, authorized Subsidiary Corporation’s 
issuance of its shares to Parent Corporation. Parent’s written consent as 
shareholder would prove that Subsidiary’s sole shareholder had 
unanimously approved the transaction. 
Parent Corporation could not enter into any transaction that required 
approval of its shareholders because it would have no shareholders. But 
Parent Corporation would have the necessary authority to fulfill its two 
purposes: managing Subsidiary Corporation and voting Subsidiary 
Corporation’s shares. Parent Corporation’s management is in the ordinary 
course of Parent Corporation’s business, and Parent Corporation’s manager, 
Subsidiary Corporation, does not need the approval of Parent Corporation’s 
shareholders to vote Subsidiary Corporation’s shares.102 
In parent-company voting, DGCL § 160(c) disqualifies votes of parent 
company shares cast by parent’s majority-owned subsidiary. That provision 
does not apply in this hypothetical for two reasons. First, DGCL § 160(c) 
has been interpreted to bar only subsidiary voting in parent elections. It does 
not also bar the voting employed here—parent voting in subsidiary 
elections. As the court explained: 
[Barring both votes] would lead to the inequitable and anomalous 
 
 
102. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
601, 616 (2006) (“Under the Delaware Code, for example, shareholder voting rights are essentially 
limited to the election of directors and approval of charter or bylaw amendments, mergers, sales of 
substantially all of the corporation’s assets, and voluntary dissolution.”). 
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result that the shares of the parent company owned by the subsidiary 
are sterilized and the shares of the subsidiary owned by the parent 
are also sterilized. Under plaintiffs’ view, the parent company not 
only loses the ability to vote its shares owned by the subsidiary, as 
contemplated by the statute, but also loses voting control over its 
subsidiary as well.103 
Second, Parent Corporation does not need to vote the shares of 
Subsidiary Corporation to control Subsidiary Corporation. It controls 
Subsidiary Corporation through its management contract. The possibility 
that the two corporations accomplished through a management contract 
what they could not have through reciprocal shareholdings is not a concern 
under Delaware law. Delaware follows the doctrine of independent legal 
significance: 104 
[A]ction taken in accordance with different sections of [the Delaware 
General Corporation Law] are acts of independent legal significance 
even though the end result may be the same under different sections. 
The mere fact that the result of actions taken under one section may 
be the same as the result of action taken under another section does 
not require that the legality of the result must be tested by the 
requirements of the second section.105 
Even if Subsidiary Corporation did own and vote the shares of Parent 
Corporation, the scheme could still work if the AE formed Parent 
Corporation under the law of a jurisdiction that did not follow the rule in 
DGCL § 160(c). In precisely that situation, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that the law of the parent corporation’s incorporation jurisdiction—
Panama law—applied and allowed the Delaware subsidiary to vote shares 
in its Parent.106 Other countries follow the same rule as Panama.107 Thus, on 
the facts of the hypothetical, the Delaware subsidiary can control both itself 
and its parent through circular shareholdings.  
 
 
103. In re Best Lock Corp. S’holder Litig., 845 A.2d 1057, 1088 (Del. Ch. 2001) (emphasis in 
original). 
104. In re Hesston Corp., 870 P.2d 17, 39–40 (Kan. 1994). 
105. Orzeck v. Englehart, 195 A.2d 375, 377 (Del. 1963). 
106. McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 212 (Del. 1987) (holding that “under limited 
circumstances the laws of Panama permit a subsidiary to vote the shares of its parent”); id. at 218 
(holding that “application of 8 Del. C. § 160(c) to [the Panamanian parent corporation] would unfairly 
and, in our opinion, unconstitutionally, subject those intimately involved with the management of the 
corporation to the laws of Delaware”). 
107. E.g., Furman v. Sherwood, 833 F. Supp. 408, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“Since, under a Bermuda 
Supreme Court ruling, Sea Containers’ subsidiaries are permitted to vote the shares they hold in their 
parent, this ownership situation effectively insulated the Company from new hostile takeover bids.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/7
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2. Model Business Corporation Act Corporations 
Initiators could create algorithmic corporations under the Model 
Business Corporation Act in essentially the same manner. Although MBCA 
§ 8.01(a) requires that “[e]xcept as may be provided in an agreement 
authorized under section 7.32, each corporation shall have a board of 
directors,” MBCA § 7.32(a) makes “effective” an agreement among the 
shareholders that “eliminates the board of directors.”  
If such an agreement “limits the discretion or powers of the board of 
directors,” it “impose[s] upon the person or persons in whom such discretion 
or powers are vested, liability for acts or omissions imposed by law on 
directors.”108 Because the definitions in MBCA § 1.40 make clear that those 
“persons” may include foreign and domestic corporations, partnerships, 
limited partnerships, and limited liability companies,109 it is also clear that 
the shareholders who make the agreement need not be natural persons. No 
other provision requires the involvement of a natural person in an MBCA 
corporation. 
The requirement that the agreement be “among the shareholders” implies 
the necessity for at least two shareholders. But the Official Comment to 
MBCA § 7.32(b) states that “[w]here the corporation has a single 
shareholder, the requirement of an ‘agreement among the shareholders’ is 
satisfied by the unilateral action of the shareholder in establishing the terms 
of the agreement, evidenced by provisions in the articles of incorporation or 
bylaws, or in a writing signed by the sole shareholder.”  
It follows that an initiator could create an algorithmic corporation in an 
MBCA jurisdiction by creating the corporation and another entity of any 
type to serve as its shareholder. The initiator would put the algorithm in 
control of both. The shareholder entity could then adopt a shareholder 
agreement that eliminated the corporation’s board of directors and 
transferred the board’s discretion and powers to the shareholder. The result 
would be an AE-owned and controlled, humanless MBCA corporation. 
3. Partnerships  
Initiators can create algorithmic limited partnerships under the Uniform 
 
 
108. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(e) (2016). 
109. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.40 (2016) defines “person” to include “an individual or an entity,” 
defines “entity” to include both a “domestic and foreign business corporation” and an “unincorporated 
entity,” and defines “unincorporated entity” to include “a general partnership, limited liability company, 
limited partnership, business trust, joint stock association and unincorporated nonprofit association.” 
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Limited Partnership Act (2001) (ULPA). Formation of a limited partnership 
requires that “at least one person has become a general partner” and “at least 
one person has become a limited partner.”110 The partners must be 
“person[s],”111 but those persons can be virtually any kind of artificial 
entity.112 The use of shell corporations as partners in limited partnerships is 
commonplace.113 To create an algorithmic limited partnership, the initiator 
would first create the entities that would serve as the general and limited 
partners and then create the limited partnership between them. To assure the 
algorithm complete autonomy, the initiator should place the general partner, 
the limited partner, and the limited partnership under the algorithm’s 
control. All three entities should remain in existence because any of them 
may be called upon to act.114 
Initiators can also create algorithmic general partnerships under the 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act (2013) (RUPA). The initiator would begin 
by creating two artificial entities of almost any type, placing them under 
algorithmic control, and causing them to enter into a partnership agreement. 
Execution of the agreement would create the general partnership. The 
agreement would provide for the algorithm to manage and conduct the 
partnership business and make all partnership decisions whether in or out of 
the ordinary course of business. Under RUPA § 105(b), the agreement 
would prevail over the conflicting terms of RUPA § 401.115 To assure 
recognition of the partnership, both partners should remain in existence. The 
general partnership could become a limited liability partnership by filing a 
statement of qualification.116 
4. The AE-Human Interface 
In the analysis thus far, I have assumed that algorithms could control 
 
 
110. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (ULPA) § 201(d) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 2001) (amended 2013). 
111. Id. § 102(7), (11). 
112. Id. § 102(15) (defining person to mean “an individual, business corporation, nonprofit 
corporation, partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company . . . limited cooperative 
association, unincorporated nonprofit association, statutory trust, business trust, common-law business 
trust, estate, trust, association, joint venture, public corporation, government or governmental 
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity”). 
113. Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate General Partners of Limited Partnerships, 1 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS. L. 73, 85 (1997) (“[W]here limited partnerships are used today, it is the norm to use a 
corporation as the sole general partner.”). 
114. ULPA § 406(a) (2013) (general partner’s right to manage the partnership); § 406(b) (limited 
partner’s consent necessary to take certain actions); § 801(a)(3)(B)(i) (limited partner consent necessary 
to continue limited partnership in certain circumstances). 
115. The control provisions in UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 401(h), (k) (2013) are expressly subject to the 
terms of the partnership agreement. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § § 105(b), (c) (2013). 
116. Id. § 901(c). 
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entities only by acting directly on behalf of the entities. But algorithms 
could also control entities by controlling humans who act on behalf of the 
entities pursuant to the algorithms’ instructions. Entities so organized would 
still meet the definition of an AE because the human would have neither the 
right nor the ability to control the algorithm.  
a. Private Company Control 
For example, an AE that owned the voting shares of a corporation could 
control the corporation by electing one or more human directors, telling the 
directors what action to take, and removing and replacing the directors who 
refused to take that action. Such domination of directors by shareholders is 
contrary to law in virtually all jurisdictions.117 Regardless of the manner of 
their selection, all directors are required by law to act in what they believe 
to be the best interests of the corporation.118 
Despite the law, such domination is common and effective.119 Laws and 
contracts often give particular shareholder constituencies the power to elect 
some portion of the directors as a means of assuring the constituency 
“representation” on the board. Directors so elected are referred to as 
“constituency directors.”120 Examples include directors appointed to 
represent “preferred shareholders, controlling shareholders, joint venturers, 
 
 
117. Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Lift Not the Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’ 
Duties Really Owed?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1069, 1098 (“According to what is probably the majority 
view, instructions are not even possible when the corporation is part of a corporate group.”). 
118. Id. at 1088 (“[J]urisdictions impose a single set of fiduciary duties on directors—namely 
benefiting the corporation ‘as a whole,’ even if it is not clear what this precisely means.”); Simone M. 
Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 309, 344 
(2013) (“[O]nce a director has been elected to a corporation’s board, she owes undivided loyalty to the 
shareholders of that corporation—regardless of how she was nominated or by whom.”). Koh notes that:  
It is . . . not unusual for investors, creditors or employees to be given a right to board 
representation. It is, however, trite that all directors, and seemingly without exception, owe an 
overarching obligation to serve in good faith in the best interests of the company on whose 
board they are members. 
Pearlie Koh, The Nominee Director’s Tangled Lot, 2007 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 148, 148. 
119. Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 117, at 1117 (“In practice, restrictions imposed by corporate 
law on the books may not matter all that much.”); Amir N. Licht, State Intervention in Corporate 
Governance: National Interest and Board Composition, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 597, 610 (2012) 
(“Since the power to appoint the board of directors is vested in the general meeting, which is controlled 
by the dominant shareholder, the board may fulfill the latter’s explicit requests and implicit expectations, 
including in regard to affiliated-party transactions and other forms of extracting private benefits.”); E.W. 
Thomas, The Role of Nominee Directors and the Liability of Their Appointors, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND THE DUTIES OF COMPANY DIRECTORS 148, 150 (Ian Ramsay ed., 1997) (“I therefore 
observe that, in reality, the primary or ultimate loyalty of most nominee directors is reserved for their 
appointors and not the company to which they have been appointed.”); id. (“[I]n practice nominee 
directors are appointed to represent the interests of their appointors and that they function accordingly.”). 
120. See, e.g., Sepe, supra note 118 (explaining constituency directors). 
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family members, financial institutions, shareholder activists, government 
agencies, private-equity funds, venture capitalists, [and] labor unions”121 as 
well as directors elected through cumulative voting122 and directors placed 
on debtors’ boards by secured creditors to block the debtors from filing 
bankruptcy.123  
Numerous commentators have pointed out the inconsistency of the 
requirements placed on constituency directors—they must act solely in the 
interests of the corporation in all instances and they must represent their 
constituency in at least some instances.124 The need for thousands of 
directors, at all levels of corporate respectability, to manage that 
inconsistency has generated a practice in which constituency directors 
actually represent their constituency while credibly professing to represent 
the corporation as a whole.125 The skill they acquire in doing so is honed by 
competition for directorships in a robust market for constituency directors.  
“Nominee director” is a term sometimes used interchangeably with 
constituency director, but sometimes used to refer only to directors who 
agree expressly or impliedly to do whatever they are told. The furnishing of 
compliant nominee directors is a large-scale, and sometimes regulated 
business in offshore corporate havens,126 and a business present in many 
 
 
121. Cyril Moscow, Director Confidentiality, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 206–07 (2011). See 
also Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 117, at 1079–84 (listing categories of constituency directors). 
122. Moscow, supra note 121, at 206–07. See also Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 117, at 1072 
(discussing venture capitalists); id. at 1073 (noting that “Germany famously gives half of the seats on 
the supervisory board of its largest firms to employee representatives”). 
123. See In re Lake Michigan Beach Pottawattamie Resort LLC, 547 B.R. 899, 913 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2016) (“The essential playbook for a successful blocking director structure is this: the director must 
be subject to normal director fiduciary duties and therefore in some circumstances vote in favor of a 
bankruptcy filing, even if it is not in the best interests of the creditor that they were chosen by.”). 
124. Thomas, supra note 119, at 151 (“The conflict between nominee directors’ loyalty to the 
company in company law theory and their loyalty to the appointor in commercial practice is readily 
apparent.”). Thomas also states: 
In commercial practice, the relationship of the appointors and the nominee directors whom they 
have appointed is almost invariably that of principal and agent or employer and employee. Yet, 
acting as an agent or employee results in the nominee director being, to a greater or lesser 
extent, in breach of the recognised fiduciary duties of a director. 
Id. at 148. See also Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 117, at 1112 (noting that “[i]n cases where a clear 
advantage is conferred to the sponsoring shareholder, constituency directors are thus not even in the 
position to promote their sponsors’ ‘interests’ because they have a conflict of interest”). 
125. In recognition of this reality, the United Kingdom Companies Act defines a “shadow director” 
as “a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are 
accustomed to act,” Companies Act § 251 (2008), and requires his or her disclosure. Id. § 859, § 855(1). 
Similar provisions have been adopted in Australia and New Zealand. Lynne Taylor, Expanding the Pool 
of Defendant Directors in a Corporate Insolvency: De Facto Directors, Shadow Directors and Other 
Categories of Deemed Directors, 16 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 203, 207–08 (2010). 
126. See Taylor, supra note 125, at 207–08; James Ball, More than 175,000 UK Companies Have 
Offshore Directors, GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/04/uk-
companies-offshore-directors-figures [https://perma.cc/KE8P-2QEX]. See, e.g., Company Management 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/7
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other countries as well.127 U.S. hedge funds routinely hire nominee 
directors.128 Although some governments require that at least one director 
of a corporation doing business in the country be a resident of the country,129 
most allow all nominee directors to serve from anywhere in the world.130 
Nominee directors tend to prefer to serve from corporate haven 
jurisdictions.131 The most successful nominee directors have each held more 
than four thousand directorships.132 
The result is that AEs could easily purchase the services of compliant 
directors. Contracts for the services of nominee directors typically provide 
that an “authorized person” will furnish instructions to the director.133 The 
principal can terminate the nominee’s appointment at any time without 
giving any reason, and the nominee will resign.134 An even more direct 
 
 
Law §§ 5(2)(b), 3(1)(h) (2003) (Cayman Is.) (requiring a “company management license” for, among 
other things, “arranging for another person to act as or fulfil the function of director or alternate director 
of a company”). 
127. GU MINKANG, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COMPANY LAW 173 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that “in 
practice, nominee directors (which are the equivalent to legal person directors) commonly exist in 
China”); Henry Tan & Matthew Kyle, Local Directors No Longer Needed in Japan: Practical Issues 
with the Recent Rule Change, EXPORT TO JAPAN (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.exporttojapan.co. 
uk/blog/local-directors-no-longer-needed-in-japan-practical-issues-with-the-recent-rule-change 
[https://perma.cc/C6AN-FBDW] (“[I]f you do not want to run into delays during your set up phase, it 
may be best to either hire a representative director from the pool of talent in Japan or to appoint a 
nominee local representative from a reputable service provider.”); Companies Act § 150(1) (2013) 
(India) (“[A]n independent director may be selected from a data bank containing names, addresses and 
qualifications of persons who are eligible and willing to act as independent directors, maintained by 
anybody, institute or association, as may by notified by the Central Government.”); Japan Nominee 
Director Services, JAPAN VISA, http://www.japanvisa.com/japan-nominee-directors [https://perma 
.cc/H7SQ-W8GY] (offering the services of nominee directors in Japan). 
128. Azam Ahmed, In Caymans, It’s Simple to Fill a Hedge Fund Board, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(July 1, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/in-caymans-its-simple-to-fill-a-hedge-fund-
board/ [https://perma.cc/FV4H-FRU2] (“An analysis of thousands of United States securities filings by 
The New York Times shows that dozens of directors sit on the boards of 24 or more funds in the 
Caymans.”). 
129. E.g., Companies Act § 145(1) (2006) (Sing.) (“Every company shall have at least one director 
who is ordinarily resident in Singapore.”). 
130. E.g., Ball, supra note 126 (UK companies with directors serving from corporate havens). 
131. Id. 
132. James Ball, Offshore Secrets: How Many Companies Do ‘Sham Directors’ Control?, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/datablog/2012/nov/26/offshore-secrets-
companies-sham-directors [https://perma.cc/CQ8P-V6QG] (reporting the names of two individuals each 
of whom were listed as directors for more than 4,000 companies in the records of four tax havens). 
133. E.g., Agreement of Nominee Services, LEAPLAW, http://www.leaplaw.com/pubSearch/ 
preview/nominee.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC6T-YWQR] (“The Principal shall ensure that instructions are 
given to the Firm or the Nominee in such manner as may be required by the Firm or the Nominee.”); 
Nominee Director Agreement, ASSET INVESTMENT SERVICES, http://www.assetprotection 
.cz/knihovna/samples_of_corporate_documents/nominee_director_agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y 
BA7-XZW4] (“Nominee Director will be elected as a Director of ‘___________’ and will act in such 
capacity only under the express written instructions of beneficial shareholder.”). 
134. E.g., Agreement of Nominee Services, LEAPLAW, supra note 133, at ¶ 12 (“The Principal may 
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method of control through a nominee is for the nominee director to give the 
controller a power of attorney to act for the nominee director.135  
AE shareholders need not fear that the corporation’s nominee directors 
would breach their resignation contracts. DGCL § 228(a) authorizes the 
holder of a majority of the issued shares of a Delaware corporation to 
remove and replace any or all of the corporation’s directors at any time.136 
The shareholder does so by signed, written consent delivered to the 
corporation. Because removal does not require prior notice to the director, 
the consent can be effective immediately upon its receipt by the corporation. 
The leverage generated by this right to remove and replace is effective 
to enable human shareholders to control directors.137 No reason exists to 
believe it would be less effective when used by AE shareholders in similarly 
nefarious circumstances.138  
All of these things are possible because entity law allows them. Entity 
law allows them because the system of charter competition—not 
government—is generating entity law. 
 
 
terminate the provision of the Services by notice in writing to the Firm . . . .”); Nominee Director 
Agreement, ASSET INVESTMENT SERVICES, supra note 133, at ¶ 6 (“Nominee Director will resign his 
position of Director within 7 days of receiving a request in writing to do so by Beneficial Shareholder.”). 
135. Memorandum of Law in Support of the United States’ Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve 
John Doe Summonses, filed Mar. 25, 2002, case no. 02-0046, United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California (“One way . . . is for the nominee directors to provide the taxpayer with 
power of attorney in all matters related to the running of the IBC, allowing the taxpayer to act as an 
officer of the IBC and handle day-to-day operations without being an officer.”). 
136. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a) (2017) provides: 
[A]ny action which may be taken at any annual or special meeting of . . . stockholders, may be 
taken without a meeting, without prior notice and without a vote, if a consent or consents in 
writing, setting forth the action so taken, shall be signed by the holders of outstanding stock 
having not less than the minimum number of votes that would be necessary to authorize or take 
such action at a meeting . . . and shall be delivered to the corporation . . . .  
137. Thomas, supra note 119, at 150 (“[I]n reality, the primary or ultimate loyalty of most nominee 
directors is reserved for their appointors and not the company to which they have been appointed.”). 
U.S. courts have also shown skepticism regarding nominee directors’ independence from their 
appointors:  
The court should not [believe] that the members of a Board of Directors elected by the dominant 
and accused majority stockholder, after accusations of wrongdoing have been made, were 
selected for membership on the Board to protect the interests of the minority stockholders and 
to assure a vigorous prosecution of effective litigation against the offending majority. 
Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 53 (5th Cir. 1980). 
138. Declaration of Randy Hooczko, In re Tax Liabilities of John Does (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2014) 
(describing online advertisements offering nominee directors); Nominee Director UK, 
https://www.mailboxuk.com/nominee-director-uk?MUCampaign=CP-NomineeDirector-
Nominee%20director%20service&gclid=CjwKEAjwkPS6BRD2ioKR7K245jASJAD1ZqHOWxmWQ
GEiIX8CpxjDNT66hSqWuxYFjCfRn5moGZBaZBoC4pfw_wcB (website offering British and UK 
resident nominal directors for UK and International Companies). See Ahmed, supra note 128 (referring 
to the “director-for-hire business”). 
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b. Public Company Control 
Public companies raise large amounts of capital by selling stock in public 
markets. Shareholders control public companies by electing natural persons 
to the companies’ boards of directors. In the United States, those elections 
are highly regulated.139 The companies must disclose their own financial 
conditions, the identities of the entities that directly or indirectly control 
them, and the compensation they pay to their officers and directors. 
Candidates for directorships must disclose their backgrounds, and investors 
expect that the candidates will be prominent, reputable businesspersons.  
Companies that do not have boards might find it difficult or impossible 
to sell their shares in public markets, and artificial entities are not eligible 
to serve on boards in U.S. jurisdictions. Thus, as a practical matter, AEs 
may be able to control public companies only if, in addition to holding 
controlling blocks of shares, the AEs could persuade sufficiently prominent 
and reputable businesspeople to serve as directors of those public 
companies. The AEs might accomplish that either by persuading 
prospective directors that AE-control poses no threat to the prospective 
directors’ reputations, or by failing to reveal their AE natures to the 
prospective directors. 
Prominent, reputable businesspersons have shown no reluctance to serve 
on public company boards merely because a single person controls the 
company. Facebook, Inc. is a good illustration. Mark Zuckerberg owns 55.9 
percent of Facebook’s voting power. Yet, Facebook’s outside directors are 
all prominent, reputable businesspersons.140 Zuckerberg could remove any 
or all of them at any time without prior notice, but all have chosen to serve 
nevertheless. 
Legal scholars who are aware that AEs are possible, regard them 
positively.141 As long as that positive regard persists, a prospective 
 
 
139. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240, 14a-1–14a-9. 
140.  They are Marc L. Andreessen, a venture capitalist who was a member of the board at Hewlett-
Packard Company; Erskine B. Bowles, a former White House Chief of Staff; Susan D. Desmond-
Hellmann, CEO of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; Reed Hastings, CEO and Board Chairman of 
Netflix, Inc.; Jan Koum, co-founder and CEO of WhatsApp Inc.; and Peter A. Thiel, co-founder and 
former CEO of PayPal. FACEBOOK, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) (Feb. 2, 2017). 
141.  E.g., Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 11 and accompanying text; Daniel M. Häusermann, 
Memberless Legal Entities Operated by Autonomous Systems—Some Thoughts on Shawn Bayern’s 
Article ‘The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems’ 
from a Swiss Law, UNIVERSITY OF ST. GALLEN (Aug. 23, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper s.cfm 
?abstract_id=2827504 (“I believe that, if and when autonomous systems become sophisticated enough 
to operate a legal entity, the demand for autonomously operated entities that pursue “human-centric” 
objectives, such as profit-making or charitable purposes, will be greater than the demand for entities that 
have no human beneficiaries at all.”). 
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director’s calculus for deciding whether to join the board of an AE-
controlled public company might be no different than his or her calculus for 
deciding whether to join the board of any other single-person-controlled 
public company. The prospect will want assurances from the control person 
regarding the company’s circumstances and a clear path to exit in the event 
those assurances are breached. Large, public company directorships are 
highly attractive because they typically pay $200,000 to $400,000 a year for 
preparing for, and attending, about four to eight meetings a year.142 In 
addition, such directorships confer power, prestige, invaluable contacts, and 
access to information. AEs should have no difficulty in recruiting board 
members for companies with publicly traded shares, even though the shares 
lack voting control.143  
If I am correct in my prediction that AEs will be criminally inclined, AEs 
will soon be poorly regarded and might have to conceal their natures to 
maintain access to capital markets. That might be difficult. Current law 
requires any person that, individually or as part of a group, directly or 
indirectly owns or controls more than 5 percent of the shares of public 
companies, to disclose their identity, ownership, and voting power.144 
Current law does not require disclosure of algorithmic control, but the 
disclosures it does require would signal to astute observers the possibility 
of algorithmic control.  
To illustrate, an AE might control a private equity firm by owning 51 
percent of the private equity firm’s shares. The private equity firm might in 
turn control a public company by owning 40 million (40 percent) of the 
public company’s shares. Under those circumstances, the AE would be 
required to report the number of public company shares beneficially owned 
by it. SEC regulations define beneficial ownership to include both 
ownership and control: 
(a) [A] beneficial owner of a security includes any person who, 
directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, 
understanding, relationship, or otherwise has or shares: 
(1) Voting power which includes the power to vote, or to direct the 
 
 
142.  See, e.g., FW COOK, 2016 DIRECTOR COMPENSATION REPORT 1, https://www.fwcoo 
k.com/content/documents/publications/11-30-16_FWC_2016_Director_Comp_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2GYH-VXVD] (“Large-cap companies in our study pay directors $260,000 at the 
median and $300,000 at the 75th percentile, unchanged from last year.”).  
143. See, e.g., Prospectus (Form 424(b)(4)), SNAP, INC. (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.s 
ec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1564408/000119312517068848/0001193125-17-068848-index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/94JV-LW75] (“This is an initial public offering of shares of non-voting Class A 
common stock of Snap Inc.”). 
144.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1). 
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voting of, such security; and/or, 
(2) Investment power which includes the power to dispose, or to 
direct the disposition of, such security.145 
That number would be the number of shares owned by the private equity 
firm (40,000,000) multiplied by the proportion of the private equity firm’s 
shares owed by the AE (51 percent), which is 20,400,000. If the AE had 
neither shareholders nor outside controllers, no further disclosure would be 
required. The algorithm would control the public company indirectly, but 
would not be required to disclose its existence because the algorithm would 
not be a person.  
But any entity that disclosed ownership of a controlling interest in a 
public company, without disclosing the entity’s human beneficial owners 
would arouse suspicions, and probably attract investigations. An AE might 
be able to avoid such suspicions by appointing nominee shareholders. But 
if those nominee shareholders actually controlled the AE, they would also 
have the right to exclude the algorithm from control. If those nominee 
shareholders did not actually control the AE, the disclosure that they held 
“sole voting power” would be false. Thus, an AE could control a public 
company without disclosing its nature, but only by committing securities 
fraud.  
5. Non-U.S. Entities 
To determine the extent to which algorithms could control foreign 
entities, I chose eight representative jurisdictions for investigation: 
Germany, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, the Ras 
Al Khaimah Free Trade Zone, Japan, India, and China. In choosing them, I 
sought geographical diversity and diversity in the jurisdictions’ approaches 
to charter competition. Germany and the United Kingdom are members of 
the European Union. Germany requires that companies register at their real 
seats and so does not export entities.146 The United Kingdom is an exiting 
EU member that adheres to the internal affairs doctrine147 and has been a 
 
 
145. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3. 
146.  See, e.g., Jens Dammann, A New Approach to Corporate Choice of Law, 38 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 51, 64 n.48 (2005) (“German rules on registration and disclosure requirements cannot, 
at present, gain relevance to the market for corporate charters in any case: under German corporate law, 
corporations cannot incorporate in Germany unless their real seat is also located in Germany.”). 
147.  E.g., Jens C. Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate Law, 29 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 477, 479 n.9 (2004) (“Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom apply the state of 
incorporation doctrine.”). 
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major exporter of entities.148 Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, and the Ras 
Al Khaimah Free Trade Zone Authority in the United Arab Emirates (RAK 
FTZ) are corporate havens. They sell entities principally for export. Japan, 
India, and China are three of the worlds’ largest economies. For each 
country, I investigated the most commonly registered entity types and report 
in Table 1 on the type most hospitable to AEs. 
Generally speaking, the laws of those eight jurisdictions are less 
receptive to AEs than are the laws of U.S. jurisdictions. In contrast to U.S. 
 
 
148.  William W. Bratton et al., How Does Corporate Mobility Affect Lawmaking? A Comparative 
Analysis, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 347, 374 (2009) (“[S]hortly after the ECJ decisions more than ten percent 
of the newly incorporated companies in Germany were limited. This made Germany the absolute leader 
in post-Centros emigrations while the United Kingdom, with its private limited company form, is the 
overwhelmingly favorite host jurisdiction.”); Ball, supra note 126 (reporting that “more than 60,000” 
companies registered in the United Kingdom and then active were listed as having directors in offshore 
jurisdictions “such as the Channel Islands, British Virgin Islands, Cyprus, Dubai and the Seychelles”). 
Table 1. Legal Receptivity to AEs in Representative Countries 
(ordered from greatest to least) 
Jurisdiction 
and entity 
type 
Are members 
or shareholders 
required? 
Is circular 
ownership 
prohibited? 
Are shareholder 
names  
reported? 
Must an AE 
manage through 
humans? 
1. Cayman 
Islands LLC Yes No No No 
2. RAK FTZ 
Offshore Co. Yes 
Weak 
prohibition  Yes, to public No 
3. United 
Kingdom Co. Yes Yes Yes, to public 
No, but requires 
one human 
director 
4. P.R.C. 
LLC Yes No 
Yes, initiators 
to government 
One director, 
one supervisor 
5. German 
GmbH Yes No Yes, to public One director 
6. Japan LLC Yes No Yes, to government  Representative 
7. India LLP Yes No Yes, to government 
Two designated 
partners 
8. Swiss LLC Yes Yes Yes, to public Managing director 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/7
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jurisdictions, which generally leave it to initiators to issue—or not to 
issue—shares or memberships after formation, all eight foreign jurisdictions 
required that their entities have members or shareholders in place, and so in 
control, at formation.149 None of their laws permits memberless entities. 
In all eight jurisdictions, the controlling members or shareholders could 
themselves be artificial entities.150 Five of the eight jurisdictions require the 
controlling artificial entities to designate natural persons to act for them.151 
 
 
149. LLC Law § 5(1) (2015) (Cayman Is.) (“[A] limited liability company shall at all times have 
at least one member.”); RAK FTZ International Companies Regulations § 19(i) (2006) (“The 
incorporators of an International Company shall be deemed to have agreed to become members of the 
International Company, and on its registration shall be entered as such in its register of members.”); 
Company Law Art. 25(4) (2005) (China) (“A limited liability company shall state the following items 
in its articles of association: names of shareholders.”); Companies Act § 8(1) (2006) (U.K.) (“A 
memorandum of association is a memorandum stating that the subscribers . . . (a) wish to form a 
company under this Act, and (b) agree to become members of the company.”); id. § 9(1) (“The 
memorandum of association must be delivered to the registrar together with an application for 
registration of the company.”); Code of Obligations § 772(1) (2014) (Switz.) (“A limited liability 
company is an incorporated company with separate legal personality in which one or more persons or 
commercial enterprises participate.”); LLC Act § 8(1)(3) (2013) (Ger.) (“The following must be 
enclosed with the application for registration: A list of shareholders signed by those applying for 
registration which indicates the family name, given name, date of birth and place of residence of the 
shareholders.”); Companies Act Art. 575(1) (2005) (Japan) (“In order to incorporate an (sic) General 
Partnership Company, Limited Partnership Company or Limited Liability Company . . . persons who 
intend to be its partners must prepare articles of incorporation which must be signed by or record the 
names of and be affixed with the seals, of all partners.”); LLP Act § 6(1) (2008) (India) (“Every limited 
liability partnership shall have at least two partners.”). See Shawn Bayern, Thomas Burri, Thomas D. 
Grant, Daniel M. Häusermann, Florian Möslein & Richard Williams, Company Law and Autonomous 
Systems: A Blueprint for Lawyers, Entrepreneurs, and Regulators, 9 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 135, 
144 (2017) (“To summarize, an autonomous system cannot be given de facto legal personhood without 
human involvement by means of a Swiss stock corporation. The corporation must have at least one 
shareholder and at least one natural person acting as director. . . . A Swiss LLC must have at least one 
managing officer; managing officers must be natural persons.”). 
150. LLC Law § 26(1) (2015) (Cayman Is.) (allowing members to manage an LLC); § 13(3) 
(allowing artificial entities to be members); RAK FTZ International Companies Regulations § 39 (2006) 
(allowing management by not less than one director); RAK FTZ Standard Articles of Association ¶ 38 
(recognizing that a “body corporate” may be a director); U.K., Companies Act § 155 (2006) (requiring 
that a “company must have at least one director who is a natural person,” but stating that the “requirement 
is met if the office of director is held by a natural person . . . by virtue of an office”). An AE could 
circumvent the UK requirement either by appointing two legal person directors to outvote the human, 
or by establishing an office in the controlling entity to which the algorithm could easily appoint, and 
from which it could easily remove, natural person nominees. 
151. Code of Obligations Art. 814(2) (2014) (Switz.) (“[A]t least one managing director must be 
authorized to represent the company.”); Bayern et al., supra note 149, at 144 (“Only natural persons—
that is, humans—are eligible to be appointed to [the board of a Swiss GmbH].”); LLC Act § 6(1) (2013) 
(Ger.) (“The company must have one or more directors.”), § 6(2) (“Only a natural person of full legal 
capacity may be a director.”); Bayern et al., supra note 149, at 143 (noting that the statute that “allows 
only natural persons to act as directors” of a German GmbHG is under constitutional attack); Company 
Law Art. 51 (2005) (China) (“[A] limited liability company . . . may have an executive director and no 
board of directors.”), Art. 52 (“A limited liability company, which has relatively less shareholders or is 
relatively small in scale, may have 1 or 2 supervisors, and does not have to establish a board of 
supervisors.”), Art. 58 (recognizing that a “one-person limited liability company” may have a “legal 
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But, except in Switzerland152 and China,153 the requirements seem only 
directed at assuring the presence of natural persons who can be held 
accountable for the entity’s actions or failures to act, not to enable the 
natural persons to exercise independent discretion or control. To illustrate, 
Indian law requires that the artificial partners of an Indian limited liability 
partnership designate human partners. But the only provision addressing the 
function of the human partners states: 
[A] designated partner shall be (a) responsible for the doing of all 
acts, matters and things as are required to be done by the limited 
liability partnership in respect of compliance of the provisions of this 
Act including filing of any document, return, statement and the like 
report pursuant to the provisions of this Act and as may be specified 
in the limited liability partnership agreement; and (b) liable to all 
penalties imposed on the limited liability partnership for any 
contravention of those provisions.154 
Those duties are all ministerial. 
Except in Switzerland and China, the human representatives that the 
owners must appoint appear to be mere agents. If so, algorithms could 
simply hire such agents and instruct them. Except in China,155 the 
representatives can be removed and replaced at will, opening the door to 
 
 
person” as its shareholder); Companies Act Art. 598(1) (2005) (Japan) (juridical partners who execute 
the business must appoint persons to execute their duties); LLP Act § 7(1) (2008) (India) (“[I]n case of 
a limited liability partnership in which all the partners are bodies corporate . . . at least two individuals 
who are partners of such limited liability partnership or nominees of such bodies corporate shall act as 
designated partners.”). But see Vivian Bath, The Company Law and Foreign Investment Enterprises in 
the PRC–Parallel Systems of Chinese-Foreign Regulation, 30 U. NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 774 (2007) 
(asserting that a wholly foreign owned enterprise with only one shareholder is not required to have a 
supervisor). 
152. Code of Obligations Art. 810(2) (2014) (Switz.) (“Subject to the reservation of the following 
provisions, the managing directors have the following inalienable and irrevocable duties: 1. the overall 
management of the company and issuing the required directives . . . .”); see also Bayern et al., supra 
note 149, at 144. 
All private law entities in Switzerland are required to have a supreme governing body. 
Depending on the type of entity, the supreme governing body may be a board of directors (in 
the case of a stock corporation), one or several managing officers (in the case of an LLC), or a 
board of trustees (in the case of a foundation). Only natural persons — that is, humans — are 
eligible to be appointed to such body. 
153. Company Law Art. 52 (2005) (China) (“No director or senior manager may concurrently 
work as a supervisor.”), Art. 54 (providing that the “supervisor of a company with no board of 
supervisors may” check “the financial affairs of the company” and supervise “the duty-related acts of 
the directors”).  
154. LLP Act § 8 (2008) (India). 
155. Company Law Art. 53 (2005) (China) (“Every term of office of the supervisors shall be 3 
years.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
2018] ALGORITHMIC ENTITIES 923 
 
 
 
 
virtually complete de facto algorithmic control.156 As was previously 
discussed, nominees who can be removed and replaced at will are 
notoriously pliable.157 
In combination, requiring that entities have owners and allowing 
artificial entities to fill that role leaves AE initiators with essentially four 
strategies for putting algorithms in control of non-U.S. entities. First, except 
in the United Kingdom158 and Switzerland,159 the initiator could create two 
domestic AEs, each owning and controlling the other.160 Circular ownership 
would avoid the infinite regress in which each artificial owner would itself 
have to have an artificial owner. But circular ownership would make it 
easier for the government or others to discover the AE.161 Entity ownership 
records are visible to the governments in six of the eight jurisdictions and 
to the public in three of the six.162  
 
 
156. Company Law Art. 51 (2005) (China) (“As for a limited liability company with relatively 
less shareholders or a relatively small limited liability company, it may have an executive director and 
no board of directors.”), Art. 62 (providing that a single shareholder can make decisions simply by 
writing them); Code of Obligations Art. 815(1) (2014) (Switz.) (“The members’ general meeting may 
remove managing directors that it has appointed at any time.”); LLC Act § 38 (2013) (Ger.) (“The 
directors’ appointment may be revoked at any time without prejudice to claims for compensation 
resulting from existing agreements.”); Companies Act Art. 914 viii (2005) (Japan) (“The registration of 
incorporation of a Limited Liability Company shall be completed by registering . . . if the partner 
representing the Limited Liability Company is a juridical person, the name and domicile of the person 
who is to perform the duties of such partner.”); LLP Act § 7(2)(ii) (2008) (India) (“[A]ny partner may 
become a designated partner by and in accordance with the limited liability partnership agreement and 
a partner may cease to be a designated partner in accordance with limited liability partnership 
agreement.”). 
157. See supra notes 117–138 and accompanying text. 
158. The United Kingdom Companies Act prohibits circular ownership of companies. Companies 
Act § 136(1) (2006) (U.K.) (“[A] a body corporate cannot be a member of a company that is its holding 
company, and . . . any allotment or transfer of shares in a company to its subsidiary is void.”). 
159. Code of Obligations Art. 783 (2014) (Switz.) (prohibiting circular ownership). 
160. LLC Law § 9(4)(c) (2015) (Cayman Is.) (“Unless its LLC agreement provides otherwise, a 
limited liability company has the power . . . to . . . purchase, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire, 
own, hold, vote, [or] use . . . shares or other interests in . . . any other entity . . .”); Company Law Art. 
16 (2005) (China) (“Where a company intends to invest in any other enterprise or provide guarantee for 
others, it shall, according to the provisions of its articles of association, be decided at the meeting of the 
board of directors or shareholders’ meeting or shareholders’ assembly.”); LLC Act § 33(2) (2013) (Ger.) 
(“The company may purchase own shares for which capital contributions have been paid in full . . . ”). 
Japan and India prohibit circular ownership with respect to stock companies, but have no corresponding 
provision applicable to limited liability companies. Companies Act Art. 135 (2005) (Japan); Companies 
Act § 149 (India). A RAK FTZ International company cannot acquire its own shares by share purchase, 
RAK FTZ International Companies Regulations § 31(2006), or redemption, id. § 30, but there is no 
prohibition on purchase of the shares of a subsidiary. 
161.  Not all circular ownership would be to facilitate AEs. Human directors or managers may 
create circular ownership as a means of guaranteeing their continuation in office.   
162.  RAK FTZ International Companies Regulations § 25 (2006) (disclosure to government and 
the public); Company Law Art. 25(4) (2005) (China) (disclosure to government); Companies Act § 
116(1) (2006) (U.K.) (disclosure to government and the public); LLC Act § 40 (2013) (Ger.) (disclosure 
to government and the public); Companies Act Art. 914 (2005) (Japan) (disclosure to the government); 
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A second strategy would be for an ownerless entity from a jurisdiction 
that does not require the keeping of ownership records to own the domestic 
entity.163 The principal disadvantage of this approach is that the AE dyad 
would be present, and so perhaps vulnerable, in two jurisdictions. 
Third, the initiator could arrange multiple entities from different 
countries in circular ownership. The circle would run through jurisdictions 
where the governments do not collect the identities of shareholders or 
members. Because the ownership is ultimately circular, it might violate the 
law in some of those countries. Even if the governments pool the ownership 
information they do collect, that information would not be sufficient to 
reveal the circularity of the ownership, but the circularity might still be 
revealed through discovery in civil litigation.  
A fourth strategy would be for the domestic entity to designate a human 
to act as its nominee shareholder. As the entity’s sole shareholder, the 
nominee would execute the algorithm’s instructions. The disadvantage is 
that the nominee might disregard instructions or even discover and reveal 
the AE’s nature. 
This section has shown that AEs can control most entity types formed in 
most U.S. jurisdictions. Even outside the United States, AEs could control 
at least one type of entity in most jurisdictions. In some, that control could 
be direct, as it would be in the United States. In others, the AE may be 
dependent on nominees, may need to use multi-entity structures, or both. 
Ultimately, however, AEs could exist almost anywhere in the world.  
B. The Mobility Problem 
Humans will have difficulty controlling AEs because AEs can migrate 
across state and national borders to avoid detection and regulation. Cross-
border migration can be the electronic transfer or redistribution of an 
algorithm, a change in the physical location of the AE’s assets or operations, 
a mere change in the entity’s registration jurisdiction, or any combination 
of these. 
1. Mobility of Algorithms 
Algorithms are computer programs. They can move across borders as 
easily as a program can be downloaded from a foreign server. Copies of an 
algorithm or its components can exist in numerous jurisdictions 
simultaneously.  
 
 
LLP Act § 25 (2008) (India) (disclosure to the government). 
163.  See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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Governments could seek to prevent AEs by regulating algorithms 
directly and enforcing the regulations by detecting and destroying 
noncompliant algorithms. But an intelligent algorithm can back itself up in 
multiple jurisdictions, manage its own locations, and employ encryption to 
avoid detection. To predict the degree to which the governments or the 
algorithms would prevail in such a contest would require an analysis of 
technology that is outside the scope of this Article. I acknowledge the 
possibility that governments might be successful in regulating algorithms 
directly,164 but assume for purposes of this Article that they will not. 
2. Mobility of Assets and Operations  
AEs have the same rights and abilities as other property owners to move 
assets and operations across borders to escape regulation. But, to the extent 
that an entity’s assets and operations remain in a jurisdiction, the 
government has the power to seize them. As a result, the entity remains de 
facto subject to the jurisdiction’s regulation. Governments regulate foreign 
entities that have local assets and operations in two ways. First, the 
government may enact regulations that apply extraterritorially and enforce 
them by proceeding against the local assets. The U.S. government has 
employed this strategy with respect to bankruptcy court jurisdiction over 
debtors’ foreign assets.165 Second, the government may condition the right 
to do business in the jurisdiction on compliance with the regulations. For 
example, a U.S. state has the constitutional right to exclude foreign entities 
from doing business within its borders,166 provided that its restrictions do 
not interfere with interstate commerce.167  
 
 
164.  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1, (2017) (speculating on the kind of regulation necessary). 
165.  LOPUCKI, supra note 53, at 189–92 (describing cases). 
166.  Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 652 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Mo. 1983) (“It has been held both 
before and after the Fourteenth Amendment that a State may impose on a foreign corporation for the 
privilege of doing business within its borders more onerous conditions than it imposes on domestic 
companies.”).  
167.  JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 1:4 (3d 
ed. 2015) (“As a consequence of being denied citizenship status, states may, as a valid exercise of their 
police powers, regulate foreign corporations conducting business within their borders, provided the 
regulations do not impermissibly affect commerce.”). 
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Despite those theoretical possibilities, governments generally have not 
sought to regulate entities incorporated elsewhere. Instead, they yield to the 
entity law of the formation jurisdiction.168 U.S. states require foreign 
corporations doing business within their borders to identify themselves, 
designate resident agents to receive service of process, and pay fees that 
approximate those for incorporation in the state.169 Those requirements are 
the same, whether the jurisdiction of incorporation is in another state or 
outside the country.170 The same is true in Canada and Australia.171 Within 
the European Union, the right of freedom of establishment entitles an entity 
formed in one member state to do business in other member states.172 A 
small minority of jurisdictions do regulate the internal affairs of foreign 
corporations. First, California,173 Japan,174 and India175 have adopted 
versions of the pseudo-foreign corporation doctrine. That doctrine applies 
the law of the jurisdiction to a foreign-incorporated company if the company 
is principally located in the jurisdiction. Second, New York,176 
Switzerland,177 and perhaps other jurisdictions, regulate some of the internal 
affairs of foreign entities doing business within their territories. Third, 
several European jurisdictions continue to apply the “real seat” doctrine.178 
That doctrine requires a business to incorporate in the jurisdiction if its 
administrative center is in the jurisdiction,179 and treats the business as 
unincorporated if the business does not do so.180  
 
 
168. Qualifying to Do Business Outside Your State, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/qualifying-do-business-outside-state-29717.html [https://perma.cc/M3KM-X69P] (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2017) (“Qualification is simply a registration process that involves filing paperwork and 
paying fees—similar to the procedures and fees required for incorporating your business or forming 
your LLC.”). 
169.  E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2105. 
170.  E.g., id. § 171 (“‘Foreign corporation’ means any corporation other than a domestic 
corporation . . . .”). 
171.  John C. Coffee, Jr. et al., The Direction of Corporate Law: The Scholars’ Perspective, 25 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 79, 91 (2000) (“Both Canada and Australia have, for example, federal systems in which 
business firms incorporate under a provincial corporate law. In principle, this supplies the preconditions 
for charter competition, as firms can choose between the corporate laws of different provinces.”). 
172.  Case C-212/97- Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 ECR I-1459, 2 C.M.L.R. 
551 (1999).  
173.  Cal. Corp. Code § 2115 (2009). 
174.  Companies Act Art. 821(1) (2005) (Japan) (“A Foreign Company that has its head office in 
Japan or whose main purpose is to conduct business in Japan may not carry out transactions continuously 
in Japan.”).  
175.  Companies Act § 379 (2013) (India) (providing that the Companies Act applies to foreign 
companies if they are at least 50 percent owned by Indian investors). 
176.  N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1317 (2017) (“[T]he directors and officers of a foreign corporation 
doing business in this state are subject, to the same extent as directors and officers of a domestic 
corporation, to the provisions of . . . Section 719 (Liability of directors in certain cases).”). 
177.  Federal Act on Private International Law § 159 (“When the operations of a company 
established under a foreign law are managed in or from Switzerland, the liability of the persons acting 
on behalf of such company is governed by Swiss law.”). 
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None of these regulations would meaningfully limit the ability of an AE 
to operate in a jurisdiction that adopted them. For example, if a Delaware 
corporation operated only in California, it would be a California pseudo-
corporation. California law would govern meetings of shareholders, the 
election of directors, and other aspects of the relationship among 
shareholders, directors, officers, and the entity.181 But those relationships 
are of no importance in an algorithm-controlled entity. If the AE had 
directors and shareholders at all, they would be nominees merely executing 
the algorithm’s instructions. Delaware law would continue to govern the AE 
in the most important respects—disclosure of beneficial ownership 
information. 
Similarly, if all operations of a Delaware-incorporated AE were in 
Germany, the arrangement would facially violate Germany’s requirement 
that a company be incorporated at its real seat.182 But the most-favored-
nation clause of the U.S.-German treaty probably entitles Delaware entities 
to essentially the same rights as those from EU countries.183 The latter are 
not required to comply with the real seat doctrine under German law. In a 
landmark decision, the European Court of Justice held that an entity that 
was formed in the United Kingdom, but which had no operations in the 
United Kingdom, had the right to conduct its only business in Denmark 
despite Denmark law to the contrary. The court said: 
It is contrary to Articles 52 and 58 [of the EC Treaty] for a Member 
State to refuse to register a branch of a company formed in 
accordance with the law of another Member State in which it has its 
 
 
178.  E.g., Werner F. Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine in the Conflict of Corporate Laws, 36 INT’L 
L. 1015, 1016 (2002) (“[T]he real seat doctrine . . . is applied in one form or another by the majority of 
the Member States of the European Union.”). 
179.  CARSTEN GERNER-BEUERLE ET AL., STUDY ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND LIABILITIES 231 
(2013), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/board/2013-study-analysis_en.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/L9EW-5GKT] (“Countries following the real seat doctrine, on the other hand, traditionally 
required from their own companies that they maintain their central administration within their 
jurisdiction.”). 
180.  Luca Cerioni, The “Uberseering” Ruling: The Eve of a “Revolution” for the Possibilities of 
Companies’ Migration Throughout the European Community?, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 117, 119 (2003) 
(“States currently using the ‘real seat’ criteria either do not recognize the legal capacity of companies 
formed under foreign legal systems but having their central management and control . . . within their 
jurisdictions, unless those companies re-incorporate according to their national provisions, or they 
consider such companies as unincorporated entities.”). 
181.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(b) (2009). 
182.  Ebke, supra note 178, at 1022 (“[A] corporation having its seat in Germany is required to 
incorporate under German law.”).  
183.  Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Ger.-U.S., art. XXV, ¶ 2, cl. 2, Oct. 20, 
1954. 
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registered office but in which it conducts no business where the 
branch is intended to enable the company in question to carry on its 
entire business in the State in which that branch is to be created, while 
avoiding the need to form a company there, thus evading application 
of the rules governing the formation of companies which, in that 
State, are more restrictive as regards the paying up of a minimum 
share capital.184 
In other words, even in the most egregious circumstances, an EU business 
can incorporate anywhere in the EU and be bound only by the entity law of 
its place of incorporation, thus avoiding the entity law of the place where it 
does business. 
This EU “right to freedom of establishment” applies only in favor of 
entities formed in European Economic Area (EEA) and other-treaty 
jurisdictions. Thus, an entity formed in a non-EU, non-other-treaty 
jurisdiction would not have the right to maintain its center of operations in 
Germany.185 But it could acquire that right simply by moving its place of 
incorporation to an EU or other-treaty jurisdiction. 
Thus, while the pseudo-foreign corporation doctrine, the real seat 
doctrine, and other similar regulations can, in some instances, limit AEs’ 
abilities to center their operations in particular jurisdictions, the limitations 
are of limited practical importance. Under current law, an AE can center its 
operations in almost any jurisdiction without incorporating in that 
jurisdiction.  
3. Mobility of Entities 
The ability to change an entity’s registration jurisdiction is important 
because the place of registration determines the applicable entity law.186 
This basic principle of international cooperation is often conflated with the 
“internal affairs doctrine” and the two are then misleadingly described as 
regulating only the relationships among the corporation and its 
shareholders, officers, and directors. 
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which 
recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a 
 
 
184.  Centros Ltd., supra note 47. 
185.  Case C-378/10 VALE Építési (2012). 
186.  For example, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13.05 (2016) provides: 
A foreign corporation shall not be denied authority by reason of the fact that the laws of the 
state under which such corporation is organized governing its organization and internal affairs 
differ from the laws of this State, and nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to 
authorize this State to regulate the organization or the internal affairs of such corporation. 
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corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships 
among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, 
and shareholders—because otherwise a corporation could be faced 
with conflicting demands. States normally look to the State of a 
business’ incorporation for the law that provides the relevant 
corporate governance general standard of care.187 
In fact, the conflated doctrines regulate rights of contract creditors,188 tort 
creditors,189 employees,190 the government,191 the public,192 and probably 
other corporate stakeholders.193 
Most importantly for present purposes, the incorporation state’s entity 
law determines who may initiate an entity, what information an initiator 
must divulge, what portion of that information will be made public, the 
extent to which humans must participate in controlling the entity, and which 
 
 
187.  Vaughn v. LJ Int’l, Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (internal citations 
omitted). 
188.  That is, entity law shields entities against contract claims. N. Am. Catholic Educ. 
Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 94 (Del. 2007) (holding that the “creditors of a 
Delaware corporation in the ‘zone of insolvency’ may not assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty against the corporation’s directors”). 
189.  E.g., Mucciarelli, supra note 48, at 457 n.163 (“Veil piercing is considered in many 
[European Union] Member States as part of the lex societatis and, consequently, governed by the state 
of incorporation.”); Japan Petroleum Co. (Nigeria) v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 831, 840 n.17 (D. 
Del. 1978) (“Delaware courts which have considered the question of whether a parent corporation should 
be subjected to liability for a subsidiary’s obligations have applied Delaware law, even in the case of 
foreign subsidiaries.”). 
190.  See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, Stakeholder Protection in Germany and Japan, 76 TUL. L. 
REV. 1673, 1675 (2002) (noting that the German system of corporate governance grants formal 
participatory rights to employees); id. at 1683–84 (noting that the Japanese system of corporate 
governance grants information rights that approximate the same results). 
191.  For example, Germany is unable to effectively impose the real seat doctrine and U.S 
jurisdictions cannot revoke the charters of corporations from other states. E.g., In re Blixseth, 484 B.R. 
360, 369–70 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (“[J]urisdiction to dissolve a corporation rests only in the courts of 
the state of incorporation.”); Young v. JCR Petroleum, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 889, 892 (W. Va. 1992) (quoting 
19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2734 (1986)) (“[T]he courts of one state do not have the power to 
dissolve a corporation created by the laws of another state.”). 
192.  See, e.g., Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and Tentative 
Explanations for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480, 1484–85 (2002): 
[I]f a company is incorporated in State X (where the law mandates that directors’ sole duty is 
to maximize shareholder value), but has its primary operations in State Y (which is solicitous 
of broader community interests), State Y arguably has an interest in ensuring that directors 
consider the interests of other corporate constituents, such as employees and community 
members. 
193.  Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. 
I-9919, I-9949 (Nov. 5, 2002) (“[T]he fundamental weakness of the incorporation principle [is that it] 
fails to take account of the fact that a company’s incorporation and activities also affect the interests of 
third parties and of the State in which the company has its actual centre of administration.”). 
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humans are considered adequate as controllers.194 Those are the issues that 
would determine the viability of an AE in the jurisdiction.  
Changing an entity’s registration jurisdiction changes the applicable 
entity law. After an entity ceases to be registered in a jurisdiction, the 
jurisdiction may continue to regulate the entity’s operations remaining in 
the jurisdiction, but is not likely to regulate the entity itself.195 Thus, an AE 
can escape regulation by its registration jurisdiction simply by changing it. 
Entities can change their incorporation jurisdictions in at least four ways, 
none of which requires movement of assets or operations. First, an entity 
can incorporate a second entity in the destination jurisdiction, transfer its 
assets to that entity, and then dissolve itself (hereinafter Sale of Assets). One 
strength of this method is that neither the entity types nor the jurisdictions 
matter, so long as the jurisdictions do not prohibit sales of assets. A second 
strength is that the transaction may be invisible. The assets need not move 
and the transaction may not be required to be recorded in any public or 
government records. Entity law sometimes authorizes this technique,196 
sometimes re-characterizes it as a merger,197 but rarely prohibits it.198 The 
weaknesses of this method are that asset sales may have adverse tax or other 
legal consequences and some assets may not be readily assignable or may 
be assignable only at substantial expense or after substantial delay.199 For 
those reasons, entities usually prefer to change their incorporation 
jurisdictions by other methods.  
Second, an entity can incorporate a second entity in the destination 
jurisdiction and merge into that entity (hereinafter Merger). This method is 
commonly available and used in all or substantially all U.S. jurisdictions.200 
The statutes of both jurisdictions must allow the merger.  
Third, the entity laws of most U.S. jurisdictions and some foreign 
jurisdictions allow foreign entities to convert to domestic entities if the 
 
 
194.  Supra notes 126–125 and accompanying text. 
195.  The United Kingdom is an exception. See Mucciarelli, supra note 45, at 429 (noting that 
“according to English law a transfer abroad of the registered office is simply impossible”). 
196.  E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (2010) (authorizing sale of all or substantially all assets). 
197.  Arrowhead Capital Fin., Ltd. v. Seven Arts Entm’t, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 6512 (KPF), 2016 WL 
4991623, at *10–13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2016) (recharacterizing asset transfers as mergers); CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 1001(a) (“A [sale of all or substantially all assets] constituting a conversion . . . is subject to the 
provisions [governing conversions] and not this section.”). 
198.  Jurisdictions that prohibit foreign investment may have such prohibitions. 
199.  Robert C. Art, Conversion and Merger of Disparate Business Entities, 76 WASH. U. L. REV. 
349, 369–72 (2001) (describing a variety of such problems). 
200.  The Model Business Corporation Act, which has been adopted in more than half of U.S. states, 
provides that “[o]ne or more domestic business corporations may merge with one or more domestic or 
foreign business corporations or eligible entities pursuant to a plan of merger.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 11.02(a) (2016). 
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foreign entity law permits (hereinafter Conversion).201 Typically, these 
jurisdictions also allow domestic entities to convert to foreign entities if the 
foreign entity law permits. For example, Delaware allows a “foreign 
corporation” to “convert to a corporation of this State”202 merely by filing 
an election to do so. The Delaware corporation thus created is “deemed to 
be the same entity as the converting other entity.”203 The “converting other 
entity” is “not required to wind up its affairs.”204 But its continuance is only 
“in the form of a corporation of this state.”205 In some jurisdictions, this 
method is referred to as “domestication.”206 
Fourth, Delaware and Nevada offer domestication procedures of a 
different type. They allow non-U.S. entities to become Delaware or Nevada 
entities while remaining in existence under non-U.S. law (hereinafter 
Domestication).207 To illustrate, the Delaware statute provides:   
[T]he corporation and such non-United States entity shall, for all 
purposes of the laws of the State of Delaware, constitute a single 
entity formed, incorporated, created or otherwise having come into 
being, as applicable, and existing under the laws of the State of 
Delaware and the laws of such foreign jurisdiction.208 
The effect of this type of domestication is to confer dual domicile on the 
entity. That is, under Delaware law, the entity has the option to renounce 
either domicile and continue to exist under the laws of the other domicile.209 
 
 
201.  See, e.g., VICTORIA APPLEWHITE, MISS. SEC’Y STATE OFFICE DOMESTICATION AND 
CONVERSION OF BUSINESS ENTITIES 3 (2012), http://www.sos.ms.gov/Policy-Research/Docu 
ments/5Background.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB9Z-TLE4] (defining “domestication” as “a procedure 
whereby a foreign corporation discontinues its incorporation under the laws of the foreign state and 
becomes incorporated under the laws of the subject state or vice versa” and reporting that “[t]hirty [U.S. 
states] in total provide for domestication of corporations”).  
202.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 265(a)–(b) (2012). 
203.  Id. tit. 8, § 265(f). 
204.  Id. tit. 8, § 265(g). 
205.  Id. 
206.  E.g., Fisher v. Tails, Inc., 767 S.E. 2d 710, 712–14 (Va. 2015) (discussing domestication under 
Virginia law). 
207.  NEV. REV. STAT. § 92A.270 (2016) provides: 
If, following domestication, an undomesticated organization that has become domesticated 
pursuant to this section continues its existence in the foreign country or foreign jurisdiction in 
which it was existing immediately before the domestication, the domestic entity and the 
undomesticated organization are for all purposes a single entity formed, incorporated, 
organized or otherwise created and existing pursuant to the laws of this State and the laws of 
the foreign country or other foreign jurisdiction. 
208.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 388(j) (2008).  
209. An entity with dual domicile can “transfer to . . . any foreign jurisdiction and, in connection 
therewith, may elect to continue its existence as a corporation of this State.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
390(a) (2012).  
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From the viewpoint of an AE, such dual domicile provides a means of 
speedy exit from a foreign jurisdiction that turns hostile. The foreign entity 
already exists under Delaware law. 
To estimate the rough proportion of jurisdictions to which AEs could 
emigrate, I surveyed the laws of the eight representative foreign 
jurisdictions on which I reported in Part II.A.5. For each, I determined first 
whether foreign entities could become domestic entities (hereinafter 
immigration) by each of four methods (Asset Sale, Merger, Conversion, and 
Domestication) and second whether domestic entities could become foreign 
entities by each of those methods (hereinafter emigration). Table 2 shows 
the results for Asset Sales, Mergers, and Conversions. Domestications are 
not shown because none of the eight jurisdictions allow them. 
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Table 2. Authorized Methods for Changing Incorporation Jurisdiction 
(ordered as in Table 1) 
Jurisdiction Entity type Asset Sale Merger Conversion 
Cayman 
Islands 
Companies 
and LLCs In and out In and out In and out 
RAK FTZ Offshore Co. In and out No in or out No in or out 
United 
Kingdom Companies 
In and out by 
absorption 
In and out, but 
only with EEA, 
treaty countries 
In but not out210 
only with EEA, 
treaty countries 
China 
Foreign and 
domestic 
companies 
No in or out No in or out No in or out 
Germany Stock or GmbH 
In and out by 
absorption 
In and out, but 
only with EEA, 
treaty countries 
In and out only 
with EEA, treaty 
countries 
Japan Stock or LLC No in or out No in or out No in or out 
India LLP In and out by absorption 
Two step in and 
out 
Two step in and 
out 
Switzerland Companies In and out by absorption In and out Out but not in 
“In” means a foreign entity can become a domestic entity of the type. “Out” 
means that a domestic entity of the type can become a foreign entity. 
“Absorption” is merger by absorption, a doctrine similar to de fact merger in 
the United States. The sale of assets for stock is regulated as if it were a merger. 
“Two step” refers to the necessity to convert an Indian LLP to an Indian 
company before it can merge or convert to foreign jurisdictions. 
 
Table 2 shows that six of the eight jurisdictions (75 percent) provide at 
least one method by which entities can immigrate and emigrate. Only Japan 
and China allow none. Although Japanese companies can merge with and 
convert to other types of Japanese companies,211 foreign companies cannot 
 
 
210. See Federico M. Mucciarelli, Company ‘Emigration’ and EC Freedom of Establishment: 
Daily Mail Revisited, 9 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 267, 285 (2008) (stating with respect to England that 
“the transfer abroad of the registered office does not shift the connecting factor and the applicable law 
does not change”). 
211.  Companies Act Art. 743 (2005) (Japan) (conversion), Art. 748 (merger). 
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merge with or convert to or from Japanese companies.212  
Chinese entities cannot sell their Chinese assets abroad,213 merge with 
foreign entities,214 or convert to foreign entities. The “merger” of Chinese 
and foreign entities allowed under recently adopted regulations actually 
authorizes only acquisitions of Chinese companies in narrow circumstances. 
The acquired company would remain incorporated in China.215 
The RAK FTZ International Companies Regulations do not provide for 
foreign, or even domestic, mergers or conversions. Nor do they, however, 
prohibit Asset Sale. From that lack of prohibition and the fact that the 
Regulations contemplate takeovers216 I infer asset sales are permitted.217 
Because the RAK FTZ Offshore company could be either the buyer or the 
seller of the assets, the Regulations do leave open a path by which AEs could 
migrate in or out of RAK FTZ Offshore companies.  
The five remaining jurisdictions offer entity migration in and out of the 
jurisdictions’ entity laws by Merger, Conversion, or Asset Sale. The 
Cayman Islands LLC Act is similar to U.S. LLC laws, and makes the rights 
to Asset Sale,218 Merger,219 or Conversion220 across international borders 
 
 
212.  Companies Act Art. 1 (2005) (Japan) (defining “company”), Art. 2 (defining “foreign 
company”). Japan does allow “triangular mergers” between Japanese and foreign companies that allow 
foreign companies to acquire Japanese companies, but the acquired companies remain Japanese. Id. Art. 
749 (2005) (Japan) (stock company), Art. 751 (membership company); William R. Huss et al., Japan’s 
New Triangular Merger Rules—Acquisition of Japanese Companies Through Share Exchanges, CLIENT 
ALERT (Apr. 25, 2007) 1, http://perma.cc/7UEF-HX47 (describing transactions in which the target 
companies remain Japanese).  
213.  Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises Art. 19 (2000) (China) (“The foreign investor 
may remit abroad legitimate profits earned from an enterprise with sole foreign investment, other 
legitimate income and funds obtained after liquidation of the enterprise.”). 
214.  As to domestic entities, see Company Law Art. 173 (2005) (China) (“The merger of a 
company may be achieved by way of absorption or consolidation.”), Art. 2 (“The term ‘company’ as 
mentioned in this Law refers to a limited liability company or a joint stock limited company established 
within the territory of the People’s Republic of China in accordance with the provisions of this law.”). 
As to wholly foreign-owned entities, see Provisions on M&A of a Domestic Enterprise by Foreign 
Investors Art. 2 (2009) (China) (allowing only mergers and asset sales resulting in “foreign investment 
enterprises”). 
215.  Provisions on M&A of a Domestic Enterprise by Foreign Investors Art. 27 (2009) (China) 
(allowing purchase of a domestic company by a surviving “overseas” company, but only if the overseas 
company is listed and the listing place has “a sound management system on securities exchange”). 
216.  RAK FTZ International Companies Regulations §§ 110–16 (2006). 
217.  If asset sales to or from RAK FTZ companies were not permitted, an entity that acquired full 
ownership of one could not integrate the entity’s assets with those of the RAK FTZ company. 
218.  LLC Law § 9(4) (2015) (Cayman Is.) (“[A] limited liability company has the power to do all 
things necessary or convenient to carry on its business or affairs, including, without limitation, power to 
. . . purchase, . . . real or personal property . . . wherever located; . . . sell . . . all or any part of its property; 
. . . purchase . . . shares or other interests in . . . any other entity.”). 
219.  LLC Law § 51(1) (2015) (Cayman Is.) (“One or more limited liability companies may merge 
or consolidate with one or more foreign entities.”). 
220.  LLC Law § 54(1) (2015) (Cayman Is.) (“Any foreign entity may apply to the Registrar to be 
registered by way of continuation as a limited liability company in the Islands.”); id. § 55(1) (providing 
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both express and reciprocal.  
Swiss law allows both “absorption by immigration”—purchase of a 
foreign company’s assets—and “combination by immigration” —merger of 
a foreign company into a Swiss company.221 It also allows the reverse of 
those two processes—“absorption by emigration” and “combination by 
emigration.”222 It allows conversion out,223 but makes no mention of 
conversion in. 
In accord with the EU’s cross-border merger directive,224 EU members 
Germany and the United Kingdom have adopted statutes permitting 
immigration and emigration by Merger or Sale of Assets,225 but only to and 
from European Economic Area countries,226 the United States,227 and other-
treaty-protected nations. The geographical limitations are probably 
unimportant because AEs from other countries could migrate in and out of 
the EU through U.S. or other jurisdictions. Although neither German nor 
U.K. statutes provide for Conversions, the European Court of Justice has 
held that EU member states must allow them.228 
The cross-border merger provisions of the Indian Companies Act (2013) 
became effective in 2017. They expressly allow Indian companies to merge 
 
 
for deregistration of Cayman Islands LLCs that qualify and apply for “continuation as a foreign entity 
under the laws of any jurisdiction outside the islands”). 
221.  Federal Act on Private International Law Art. 163 (2014) (Switz.) (“A Swiss company may 
acquire a foreign company (absorption by immigration) or form together with a foreign company a new 
Swiss company (combination by immigration).”).  
222. Federal Act on Private International Law Art. 163a(1) (2014) (Switz.) (“A Swiss company 
may acquire a foreign company (absorption by immigration) or form together with a foreign company a 
new Swiss company (combination by immigration), provided the law governing the foreign company 
permits such a merger and all the requirements of such law are met.”), id. Art. 163b (“A foreign company 
may acquire a Swiss company (absorption by emigration) or form together with a Swiss company a new 
foreign company (combination by emigration).”). 
223.Federal Act on Private International Law Art. 163(1) (2014) (Switz.) (“A Swiss company may 
subject itself to a foreign law without going into a liquidation and a re-establishment, provided it meets 
the requirements of Swiss law and continues to exist under the foreign law.”). 
224.  Directive 2005/56/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on 
Cross-Border Mergers of Limited Liability Companies, 2005 O.J. (L 310) 1 [hereinafter Cross-Border 
Merger Directive] (“The laws of the Member States are to allow the cross-border merger of a national 
limited liability company with a limited liability company from another Member State if the national 
law of the relevant Member States permits mergers between such types of company.”). 
225.  Transformation Act § 122a (2011) (Ger.) (defining cross-border merger), § 122(b) (making 
all “companies limited by shares” eligible for cross-border mergers); U.K., Companies (Cross-Border 
Mergers) Regulations 2007. 
226.  Transformation Act § 122a (2011) (Ger.) (extending cross-border merger participation to 
companies subject to the law of European Economic Area country); U.K., Companies (Cross-Border 
Mergers) Regulations 2007. 
227.  Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Germany-U.S., art. XXV, para. 5, cl. 2, Oct. 
20, 1954. 
228.  EU members are required to allow conversions by the Third Chamber of the European Court 
of Justice’s decision in VALE Építési, Case C-378/10 (2012). 
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with foreign companies by consolidation or absorption.229 Indian companies 
are not, however, a hospitable environment for AEs because Indian 
companies must be governed by human boards of directors.230 Indian LLPs 
provide a more hospitable environment, but the LLP Act does not expressly 
provide for the merger of LLPs with foreign entities.231 LLPs could, 
nevertheless, migrate to foreign entities in a two-step process. The LLP 
would first convert to an Indian company, and the Indian company would 
then convert to the foreign entity.232 
The results of the eight-jurisdiction survey summarized in Table 2 
suggest that probably most jurisdictions worldwide expressly authorize and 
seek to facilitate entity-law shopping. The two survey jurisdictions that 
meaningfully restrict shopping—China and Japan—appear to view entity 
law as a means of regulating foreign investment rather than as a source of 
government revenues or a means of attracting capital. But if an AE needed 
to be governed by the entity laws of one of those jurisdictions, it could 
migrate in by contributing assets to an AE there and migrate out by selling 
the assets and transferring the proceeds from the jurisdiction.  
Multi-step conversions, such as the Indian-LLP-to-foreign-company 
conversion previously described, are legal strategies developed by lawyers 
to facilitate entity law shopping. They are common in other jurisdictions.233 
For example, a German law firm offers these alternatives for merging a 
German company with an entity that does not qualify for foreign merger 
under the Transformation Act because it is incorporated in a non-European 
 
 
229.  Companies Act § 234(2) (2013) (India) (“Subject to the provisions of any other law for the 
time being in force, a foreign company, may with the prior approval of the Reserve Bank of India, merge 
into a company registered under this Act or vice versa.”); KPMG INTERNATIONAL, TAXATION OF 
CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS INDIA 3 (2014), https://home.kpmg.com/co 
ntent/dam/kpmg/pdf/2014/05/india-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/A52S-TXT] (“The Companies Act, 
2013, partially repeals the Companies Act, 1956. Restructuring provisions under the new law have yet 
not been made effective. However, these provisions, once effective, will permit, among other things, the 
merger of an Indian company with a foreign company, which was not previously allowed.”). 
230.  Companies Act § 149(1) (2013) (India) (“Every company shall have a Board of Directors 
consisting of individuals as directors . . . .”). 
231.  See generally LLP Act (2008) (India). 
232.  Conversion to an Indian company would be accomplished by registration of the LLP under 
the Companies Act. Companies Act § 366(1) (2013) (India) (“For the purposes of this Part [Companies 
Authorized to Register under this Act], the word ‘company’ includes any . . . limited liability partnership 
. . . which applies for registration under this Part.”).  
233.  For example, the drafters of the Model Entity Transactions Act observe that:  
[D]uring the past decade, restructuring transactions by and among all of the various types of 
entities began to occur with increased frequency. Because of a lack of clear statutory authority 
in most states, these restructuring transactions have often been completed in two or three 
indirect steps rather than directly in a single transaction.  
MODEL ENTITY TRANSACTION ACT 1 prefatory n. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). See also Art, supra note 199, 
at 369 (describing three strategies by which a partnership can become a corporation or an LLC without 
benefit of statutory authority). 
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jurisdiction: 
The first option is to transfer all assets and liabilities to the other 
company and subsequently dissolve the transferor. The second 
alternative is to transfer all interests in a German partnership to the 
foreign company. In a third option, the statutory seat of one of the 
companies can be transferred to the other jurisdiction and the 
subsequent merger will then be deemed to take place under one 
national law.234 
The availability of such strategies are often difficult to predict because they 
require imagination and are sensitive to practical limitations.235  
Because entities can change their governing laws so easily, regulations 
designed to discover, control, or prevent AEs could not be effective until 
substantially all jurisdictions adopted them.236 Until then, AEs could assume 
the nationality of the least regulated jurisdiction while continuing to operate 
throughout the world—just as has occurred with other kinds of entity-based 
crime. 
C. The Detection Problem 
To regulate AEs, the legal system must be capable of detecting them in 
jurisdictions throughout the world. The method currently proposed for 
detecting the persons behind terrorist and other criminal enterprises is 
probably also the method that could best detect AEs. As discussed in this 
section, that method is for chartering governments to require that entities 
disclose their “beneficial owners”—the humans who ultimately own and 
control the entities, directly or indirectly. That requirement would put each 
AE to a choice. The AE would have to either admit it is algorithmically 
controlled or fraudulently report some human or humans as its beneficial 
owner. Criminal investigators could then ferret out the AEs by assessing the 
plausibility that the humans disclosed by suspects are the suspect’s actual 
controllers. In the analogous situation with criminal enterprises, 
investigators report that, when confronted, the “front men” usually fold 
 
 
234.  MARTIN IMHOF, CROSS-BORDER MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN GERMANY: A TRANSACTION 
GUIDE FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS 18 (2015), https://www.heuking.de/fileadmin/DATEN/Dokumente/ 
Internationales/Transaction_Guide_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX7H-T92K]. 
235.  See, e.g., Art, supra note 199, at 369–72 (describing some practical difficulties with strategic, 
multi-step conversions in the United States). 
236.  See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 2, at 91 (“For a corporate law to be truly mandatory, it must 
be adopted by all fifty states and the District of Columbia, because firms can change their domicile.”). 
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easily and confess.237 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body 
established in 1989 to combat “money laundering, terrorist financing and 
other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system.”238 
FATF’s thirty-seven members include the United States and the 
governments of all of the other leading financial powers.239 FATF has 
recommended the disclosure and verification of beneficial owners,240 and 
the Obama administration supported legislation that would have compelled 
disclosure for entities chartered in the United States.241 But after a decade, 
the legislation has not been adopted. The Trump administration has not yet 
taken a position on it. 
At present, governments collect widely differing types and amounts of 
information regarding the entities they charter. The information collected is 
referred to as the “registry.” Investigators of entity misuse report that 
registries are “generally the most valuable and accessible sources of 
information for investigations.”242 Investigators use the registry information 
to identify the humans operating behind the entities, that is, the entities’ 
beneficial owners. 
In its first three subsections, this section distinguishes three kinds of 
incorporation information that are, or might be collected. They are 
incorporator information, owner and director information, and beneficial 
owner information. The final subsection contrasts the information required 
to be collected during Delaware incorporation with beneficial owner 
information. It then briefly describes a recently published empirical study 
showing the ease with which initiators can—despite international standards 
to the contrary—form entities through corporate service providers 
throughout the world without furnishing meaningful proof of identity.  
 
 
237.  EMILE VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., THE PUPPET MASTERS: HOW THE CORRUPT USE 
LEGAL STRUCTURES TO HIDE STOLEN ASSETS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 63 (2011), available at 
https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/puppetmastersv1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S86Z-ZHGX] 
[hereinafter PUPPET MASTERS] (“[F]ront men [, as distinguished from professional service providers,] 
usually give up, confess, and cooperate when the police come after them.”). 
238. Who we are, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ [https://p 
erma.cc/PN2S-4AVG] (last visited Oct. 12, 2017). 
239.  FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF Members and Observers, 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/#d.en.3147 [https://perma.cc/88D7-Z8T6] (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2017). 
240.  See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
241.  Caroline Atkinson, Beneficial Ownership Legislation Proposed, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 4, 
2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/04/04/beneficial-ownership-legislation-proposal [https: 
//perma.cc/H7V3-3T25] (“This proposal would require the Internal Revenue Service to collect 
information on the beneficial owner of any legal entity organized in any state, and would allow law 
enforcement to access that information.”). 
242.  PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 237, at 70. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss4/7
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1. Incorporators 
Registries charter entities on written request. For lack of a better word, I 
refer to the person who formally requests the entity’s formation as the 
“incorporator,” regardless of the registered entity type. The incorporator 
may or may not be the “initiator” who set the entity formation process in 
motion. 
Corporate service providers are private businesses that form entities for 
initiators or guide initiators through the entity formation process. Corporate 
service providers include companies formed specifically to provide those 
services as well as law firms, accountants, and notaries. Corporate service 
providers may serve as incorporators, provide nominee shareholders and 
directors, file annual reports, and pay fees on behalf of their clients. As a 
result, government registries may have no contact with the initiators and 
receive no information about them. The corporate service providers may or 
may not have received and retained information about their clients. If the 
corporate service providers are attorneys, the information retained may or 
may not be protected by attorney-client privilege. 243  
Some corporate service providers form companies on their own 
initiative, with the intention of later selling them. Those companies are 
referred to as “shelf companies.”244 Anyone can form and sell shelf 
companies. U.S. law does not require sellers to obtain or verify the buyer’s 
identity or keep records of the sale. If the seller does not, the company is 
anonymous.245  
2. Owners and Directors  
Some registries, particularly outside the United States, contain 
ownership information.246 Typically, that information is the names and 
addresses of the shareholders of a corporation or the interest holders in a 
 
 
243.  Id. at 94 (noting that “almost all of the investigators interviewed” in a study of the corrupt use 
of legal structures mentioned “attorney-client privilege” as an impediment to obtaining information). 
244. Id. at 37. 
245.  Business Formation and Financial Crime: Finding a Legislative Solution: Before the S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 5 (2009) (statement of Jennifer Shasky, then 
Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/testim 
onies/witnesses/attachments/11/05/09/11-05-09-shasky-business-formation-financial-crime.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MK3T-7TV4] (“[C]riminals can easily throw investigators off the trail by purchasing 
shelf companies and then never officially transferring the ownership. In such cases the investigation 
often leads to a [dead-end] formation agent who has long ago sold the company with no records of the 
purchaser and no obligation to note the ownership change.”). 
246.  See supra Table 1, column 4. 
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limited liability company or limited partnership. Ownership information is 
often less useful than one might suppose, because owners layer their 
entities:  
[I]f, as part of a money laundering investigation, the authorities in 
Country A manage to successfully cooperate through the appropriate 
formal channels with the authorities of Country B to discover the 
shareholders of a corporation registered in that jurisdiction, they may 
well find that the listed shareholders of that corporation are in fact 
corporations registered in Countries C and D.247 
Of course, when the investigators gain the cooperation of Countries C 
and D, they may find that the entities formed in them are also owned by 
entities registered in yet other jurisdictions. Worse yet, and probably more 
likely, they may find that Countries C and D did not collect ownership 
information at all. That may be the end of the investigative trail. As a 
prominent prosecutor put it, “‘owner-of-record’ information . . . is of little 
value from a law enforcement perspective. The owner-of-record can be 
another shell company, another straw owner, an incorporation service—
anything.”248 
Some registries contain director information. In some jurisdictions, those 
directors must be humans, but in others they can be artificial entities.249 In 
most jurisdictions, a single director is sufficient, and, as previously 
discussed, directors may be mere nominees.250 As a result, information 
about directors may not be information about beneficial owners. 
3. Beneficial Owners 
Widely accepted international standards state that “[c]ountries should 
ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on the 
beneficial ownership and control of legal persons that can be obtained or 
accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities.”251 The beneficial 
owner is “the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls [an artificial 
entity] and/or the natural person on whose behalf a transaction is being 
 
 
247.  PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 237, at 52. 
248.  Examining State Business Incorporation Practices, supra note 10, at 2. 
249.  FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, THE MISUSE OF CORPORATE VEHICLES, INCLUDING TRUST AND 
COMPANY SERVICE PROVIDERS 12 (2006), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/M 
isuse%20of%20Corporate%20Vehicles%20including%20Trusts%20and%20Company%20Services%
20Providers.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC94-2NJB] (“Nineteen of the 32 jurisdictions responding to the 
survey indicated that corporations are permitted to serve as directors, whereas corporate directors are 
prohibited in eight. Five jurisdictions failed to provide an answer to this item on the questionnaire.”). 
250.  See supra notes 117–138 and accompanying text. 
251.  FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 43, at 22. 
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conducted.”252  
“Ultimately owns” in that definition is a reference to the possibility of 
indirect ownership.253 A person who owns the shares or interests of an entity 
is referred to as a direct owner. For example, if N is a natural person who 
owns shares or interests in A, an artificial entity, N is a direct owner with 
respect to A. A person who does not own the shares or interests of an entity, 
but owns the shares or interests of an entity that does, is referred to as an 
indirect owner. If A in the preceding example owns shares or interests in B, 
a second artificial entity, and B owns shares or interest in C, a third artificial 
entity, then (1) B is a direct owner of C and (2) N and A are each indirect 
owners of C.  
The FATF definition—which does not contemplate AEs—states 
unequivocally that the term “beneficial owner” refers to natural persons: 
“[A] beneficial owner is always a natural person—a legal person cannot by 
definition, be a beneficial owner. The definition therefore speaks of 
‘ultimate’ control: A legal person can never be the ultimate controller—
ownership by a legal person is itself always controlled by a natural 
person.”254 
Persons can control artificial entities by means other than share 
ownership. For example, a nonprofit corporation may have no shareholders, 
interest holders, or members. If such a corporation’s directors elect their 
own successors, the directors control the corporation and are its beneficial 
owners. 
Non-owners can control entities in a variety of other ways. The share 
owner may be a family member, a business associate, or a nominee who 
follows the non-owner’s instructions out of loyalty or fear or for mutual 
benefit. 
More esoterically, a person might control an entity by purchasing 
derivative contracts for the entity’s shares from derivative dealers or banks. 
The contracts would provide that the dealers or banks will settle the 
contracts by paying the person cash in amounts equal to the underlying 
shares’ values at the time of settlement. In such a transaction, the dealer 
“usually assumes a neutral risk position by physically acquiring the 
underlying shares at the strike price of the derivative.”255 If the contract is 
 
 
252.  Id. at 113. 
253.  Id. at 113 n.52 (“‘[U]ltimately owns or controls’ and ‘ultimate effective control’ refer to 
situations in which ownership/control is exercised through a chain of ownership or by means of control 
other than direct control.”). 
254.  PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 237, at 19. 
255.  Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Beneficial Ownership and Control: A Comparative Study–Disclosure, 
Information and Enforcement 13 (OECD Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 7, 2013), 
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performed, the person receives the profits and suffers the losses from the 
share ownership. If the dealer votes the shares as the person directs, the 
person may control the entity.256 
Beneficial ownership is thus a difficult relationship to discover and an 
even more difficult one to prove. As the following subsection demonstrates, 
the only way governments can assure the existence of “accurate and timely 
information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons”257 is 
to place on each entity the continuing obligation to disclose its beneficial 
owners. Yet, probably no American state imposes that obligation or 
otherwise requires the disclosure of beneficial ownership.258 
4. Disclosure in the Entity Formation Process  
Governments that compete for incorporations are in a bind. FATF, other 
international organizations, and perhaps the executive branch of the U.S 
government are pressing for disclosure of beneficial ownership information. 
But for many charter buyers, freedom from disclosure is the most important 
feature of the product. Governments respond to these conflicting pressures 
by appearing to collect meaningful information while not actually doing so. 
This section describes the complex disclosure requirements of Delaware 
law. Delaware is an important example because it is the jurisdiction most 
successful in selling charters and the jurisdiction with the culture most 
resistant to the collection of beneficial ownership information.259 
a. Required Disclosure to Government 
 The Delaware General Corporation Law requires the identification of 
incorporators,260 registered agents,261 and communications contacts.262 
 
 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/50068886.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F999-RZW3]. 
256.  See id.  
257.  Supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
258.  FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC SHELL COMPANIES IN 
FINANCIAL CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING: LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 3 n.2 (2006), 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/LLCAssessment_FINAL.pdf. [https://perma.cc/AWD2-
Z6J8] (“Although some states require the reporting of information on ownership, no state requires the 
reporting of information on beneficial ownership.”). 
259.  Baradaran, supra note 79, at 526 (table showing Delaware to have the lowest FATF 
compliance rate of any American state). 
260.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(5) (2015) (requiring provision name and mailing address in 
the certificate of incorporation) 
261.  Id. § 102(a)(2) (requiring provision of the name and address); id. 131(c) (requiring that the 
address include street, number, city, county, and postal code). 
262.  Id. § 132(d) (2010) (requiring provision of name, business address, and business telephone to 
the registered agent). 
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None of the three is likely to be of use in discovering a Delaware 
corporation’s beneficial owner. 
“Any person, partnership, association or corporation . . . without regard 
to such person’s or entity’s residence, domicile or state of incorporation” 
may serve as an incorporator.263 Delaware law specifically contemplates 
that the incorporator may be acting on behalf of someone else264 but does 
not require disclosure of that person’s identity to anyone, even the 
incorporator. Thus, anyone, including a corporate service provider, can be 
the incorporator.265 The certificate of incorporation, a document filed with 
the state, must contain the name and a mailing address for the 
incorporator.266 Upon filing of the certificate, the incorporator becomes “a 
body corporate.”267 Nothing in Delaware law requires that the incorporator 
know the identity of the corporation’s beneficial owner. 
Every corporation is required to have a registered agent268 and a 
registered office269 in Delaware. Because the corporation itself can be the 
registered agent, the requirement collapses to the requirement of a registered 
office. The office must be “generally open.” The corporation must disclose 
its registered agent, registered office, and a street address for the registered 
office in its certificate of incorporation.270 The resident agents of most 
corporations are corporate service providers, each of whom may act on 
behalf of thousands of corporations. Nothing in Delaware law requires that 
the resident agent know the identity of the corporation’s beneficial owner. 
Every corporation is required to disclose: 
to its registered agent and update from time to time as necessary the 
name, business address and business telephone number of a natural 
person who is an officer, director, employee, or designated agent of 
the corporation, who is then authorized to receive communications 
from the registered agent.271  
 
 
263.  Id. § 101(a). 
264.  Id. § 108(d) (2014) (stating that “if any incorporator is not available to act, any person for 
whom or on whose behalf the incorporator was acting” may act). 
265.  Brett Melson, DELAWARE CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION, https://www.delawarein 
c.com/blog/Delaware-certificate-of-incorporation/ (“Harvard Business Services, Inc. is the incorporator, 
on behalf of all our clients, for the companies we file.”). 
266.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (a)(5) (2015). 
267.  Id. § 106. 
268.  Id. § 132(a) (2010). 
269.  Id. § 131(a) (2011). 
270.  Id. § 131(c) (2011) (street address). 
271.  Id. § 132(d) (2010).  
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That natural person is referred to as the “communications contact.”272 The 
communications contact may be a nominee, hired indirectly by a beneficial 
owner who remains anonymous. Nothing in Delaware law requires that the 
communications contact know the identity of the beneficial owner. 
The principal function of a registered agent is to receive service of 
process. Upon receipt, the registered agent forwards the process to the 
communications contact. If the communications contact is not the beneficial 
owner, the communications contact ordinarily would forward the process to 
the beneficial owner. The forwarding may be accomplished in a manner that 
authorities cannot track. For example, it may be emailed through an 
anonymizer or posted to a website. Alternatively, the communications 
contact may be an attorney with authority to defend the litigation. Nothing 
in Delaware law regulates the manner in which the communications contact 
deals with process or communicates with the beneficial owner. 
Arguably, a Delaware corporation must keep a stock ledger and prepare 
a list of stockholders prior to every meeting of shareholders.273 But the 
corporation keeps the ledger or list. Only the corporation’s stockholders or 
directors have the right to inspect either.274 Nothing in Delaware law 
requires disclosure of the stock ledger or stock list to any other person. 
Delaware corporations must file an annual franchise tax report.275 Each 
must be signed by a “proper officer duly authorized so to act” or by any of 
its directors, listing the person’s “official title.”276 The report must include 
the “location of the principal place of business of the corporation, which 
shall include the street, number, city, state or foreign country.”277 Aside 
from initial reports and reports filed in conjunction with dissolution, each 
report must list at least one director278 and, in Delaware, directors must be 
“natural persons.”279 The statute does not explain how Delaware interprets 
this requirement in the case of a corporation that has no directors, such as 
BA 230 Corporation.280 The report is signed under penalty of perjury.281 
 
 
272.  Id. §132(d) (2010). 
273.  Rainbow Nav., Inc. v. Pan Ocean Nav., Inc., 535 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Del. 1987), overruled on 
other grounds Pogue v. Hybrid Energy, Inc., No. 11563-VCG, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 118, at *11 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 5, 2016). (“We find it implicit in Sections 219 and 220 that Delaware corporations have an 
affirmative duty to maintain a stock ledger.”). 
274.  DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 219(c) (2017) (stockholder lists), id. § 220 (2010) (stockholder 
inspection), and id. § 221 (bondholders do not have inspection rights absent certificate of incorporation 
provisions granting them). 
275.  Id. tit. 8, § 502(a) (2017). 
276.  Id. 
277.  Id. § 502(a)(3) (2017). 
278.  Id. § 502(a)(4) (2017). 
279.  Id. § 141(a) (2016). 
280.  See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
281.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 502(b) (2017). 
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For 2016, I completed a Delaware online annual franchise tax report for 
BA 230 Corporation that did not require the name of a director. Delaware 
accepted my payment and, as of August 2017, the Delaware website 
continues to show BA 230 Corporation’s status as Good Standing.282  
The effect of this disclosure regime is that the Delaware registry will 
contain the name and mailing address of an incorporator, the name and street 
address of the a registered agent, the street address of the corporation’s 
principal place of business, and perhaps the name and street address of an 
officer or director. None may have any idea who the beneficial owners are 
or know how to locate them.283   
b. Required Disclosure to Corporate Service Providers  
Internationally accepted standards require that corporate service 
providers collect and retain proof of identity, such as a passport or other 
photo ID, with regard to their customers.284 Of course, the customers are not 
necessarily the beneficial owners of the entities formed. But if corporate 
services providers actually collected and retained the required information, 
that information could serve as a starting point for investigators seeking to 
discover the beneficial owners. 
A group of researchers led by Professor J.C. Sharman conducted 
experiments to determine the corporate service providers’ actual practices. 
The group sent 7,462 requests for anonymous incorporation to 3,773 
corporate service providers in 181 countries. Based on the responses, they 
concluded that “[i]nternational laws requiring customer identification to 
form shell companies are not effective. Almost half of the companies we 
approached did not ask for proper identification, and twenty-two percent did 
not require any identity documents.”285 The “proper identification” to which 
the researchers were referring, is “government-issued photo identification, 
whether notarized or certified.”286 They concluded that “[o]n the whole, 
forming an anonymous shell company is as easy as ever, despite increased 
regulations following September 11.”287 
 
 
282.  DEPARTMENT OF STATE: DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, https://icis.corp.delaware.gov 
/Ecorp/EntitySearch/NameSearch.aspx [https://perma.cc/TH37-H8LZ] (last visited Aug. 16, 2017). 
283.  Baradaran, supra note 79, at 507 (noting “the use of ‘formal nominees’ in identity reporting 
requirements”). 
284.  Id. at 508 (discussing the requirement of some form of identification to conduct certain 
transactions, such as a notarized passport copy and certified utility bill, to prohibit anonymous accounts 
or accounts in obviously fictitious names). 
285.  Id. at 527 (emphasis omitted). 
286.  Id. at 513. 
287.  Id. at 478. 
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In an earlier experiment, Sharman had emailed fifty-four corporate 
service providers in twenty-two countries in an effort to form entities and 
obtain bank accounts for a fictitious “international consulting” business, 
without furnishing notarized or certified proof of his identity.288 Forty-five 
returned valid replies.289 Of the forty-five, twenty-eight (62 percent) said 
they required notarized or certified proof of his identity.290 Seventeen (31 
percent of fifty-four approached) “were content to form the company 
without any independent confirmation of identity, requiring only a credit 
card and a shipping address for documents.”291 Sharman coded these 
seventeen as anonymous because “credit cards can be issued for corporate 
vehicles or supplied by a third party”292 who might not know the identity of 
the applicant or owner. Those third parties might include issuers of stored-
value cards. 
Of the seventeen willing to furnish anonymous entities, two were willing 
to furnish anonymous bank accounts293 and five were willing to furnish bank 
accounts without notarized identification. From among the five, Sharman 
formed two anonymous entities, one with an anonymous bank account.  
The first was a Seychelles company formed with a nominee director and 
bearer shares.294 “The accompanying bank account was in Cyprus, picked 
on the advice of the service provider because of this bank’s unfastidious 
willingness to accept bearer share companies.”295 The bank did require 
proof of Sharman’s identity.296 
The second was “a Nevada corporation set up by a Nevada service 
provider with a nominee director and nominee shareholders.”297 Sharman 
notes that his name “appears nowhere on the incorporation documents.”298 
The Nevada corporation was able to open an online bank account with “one 
of the top five US banks.”299 Sharman reports that “[n]either the original 
service provider nor the bank required more than an unnotarized scan of 
[his] driver’s license (showing an outdated address).”300 Sharman then 
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opened a Somalia bank account for the corporation, again furnishing only a 
copy of his corporation’s anonymous articles of incorporation and a scan of 
his driver’s license with the outdated address.301 
Sharman and his colleagues’ research demonstrates that, although most 
corporate service providers are unwilling to assist in the formation of 
anonymous entities, many are. Neither criminals nor AEs are likely to have 
difficulty finding a willing corporate service provider.  
Nor would it matter much if corporation service providers enforced the 
international standards. Corporate service providers are merely a 
convenience. Initiators can deal directly with the charter-issuing 
governments and so need to meet only the governments’ less-stringent 
disclosure standards. Initiators can serve as their own incorporators, hire 
nominees who are not regulated corporate service providers to serve as their 
incorporators, or have an entity they control serve as the incorporator. Once 
an initiator has formed a company anonymously, investigators are unlikely 
to be able to connect the entity to its beneficial owners using only the 
information the government collected during the entity formation process. 
Because the system leaves beneficial ownership information in the hands of 
corporate service providers or does not collect it at all, the lack of beneficial 
ownership information regarding an AE will not arouse suspicions. 
III. CAN THE ENTITY SYSTEM BE FIXED?  
Commentators often blithely assume that if law functions poorly, law-
makers can change it. For example, after explaining how an initiator could 
confer legal personhood on an algorithm by creating and abandoning an 
LLC to the algorithm’s control, Bayern asserted that “[o]f course, if 
legislatures do not like this possibility they can easily amend the LLC acts 
to prevent it.”302 
Bayern does not suggest what the amendment would say or how it would 
prevent AEs. In fact, the competition to sell charters makes these kinds of 
changes in entity law impossible. Legislatures are reluctant to make changes 
in entity laws that would reduce sales of the entity or make the state or 
country appear business-unfriendly. Even if a legislature made the changes, 
its actions would have little or no effect on outcomes. Most initiators would 
buy entities with the feature they want from some other government.303 
Essentially four changes in the law would be needed to prevent AEs from 
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existing or control AEs if they existed. First, the law would have to authorize 
the direct regulation of artificial general intelligence (AGI), by mandating 
programming features and verifying their installation.304 Some consensus 
exists in the AGI industry that malevolent algorithms pose a threat to 
humans.305 But legal experts are just beginning to comment on the issue of 
how to approach such regulation.306 
Second, algorithmic control of entities would have to be prohibited. The 
change is necessary to prevent algorithms—as opposed to humans using 
algorithms—from engaging in criminal activity for which no human can be 
held responsible and from resisting regulation by asserting the legal rights 
of entities they control. 
Third, as discussed in the previous section, to render AEs identifiable by 
law enforcement, the law would have to require that all entities reveal their 
beneficial owners.  
Fourth, for the international movement of money to be traced effectively, 
international cooperation would have to be automated and capable of tracing 
in real time. That will require the modification of treaties.  
Those changes will be difficult or impossible to make in time to prevent 
catastrophe because the underlying problems—entity anonymity and the 
internal affairs doctrine—are deeply embedded in the world economy. 
Uprooting anonymity would not merely expose AEs. It would expose 
bribery, crime, money-laundering, and terrorism. Changing the internal 
affairs doctrine would fundamentally redistribute political power from 
private actors to government. 
Beneficial ownership disclosure is not a presently viable reform. Several 
international organizations have promoted it for decades.307 Although the 
European Union countries have recently begun requiring the disclosure of 
beneficial owners,308 numerous countries, including the United States, have 
agreed that the reform is necessary, but have not made it. Because an entity 
can incorporate anywhere and do business anywhere else, entities that do 
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not want to disclose their beneficial owners can simply incorporate in a 
jurisdiction that does not require it.  
Through FATF, the United States has agreed that “[c]ountries should 
ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on the 
beneficial ownership and control of legal persons that can be obtained or 
accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities.”309 Implementing 
legislation has been pending in Congress for nearly a decade. 
The proposed Corporate Transparency Act of 2017310 is minimalist and 
would solve only part of the problem. The bill would require states to collect 
beneficial ownership information, which would include only name, current 
residential or business street address, and a unique identifying number from 
an unexpired passport or driver’s license.311 It would not require applicants 
to furnish copies of the passports or licenses or require the states to verify 
the information. The states could delegate the collection to licensed entity 
formation agents.312 The entities would be required to update the beneficial 
owner information within 60 days after changes.313 The collected 
information would be available only for law enforcement purposes and only 
pursuant to formal processes.314 
Despite its minimalism and safeguards, the bill has not gained political 
traction. The most recent estimate of the bill’s passage (for the predecessor 
bill in 2016) gave it a 1 percent chance.315 As a result of that failure, FATF 
rates U.S. “measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons” to be 
“inadequate.”316 “The U.S. legal framework has serious gaps that impede 
effectiveness in this area.”317 
Publicly, the bill’s opponents argue that requiring beneficial owner 
identification will slow the incorporation process and make it more 
expensive.318 But the vast majority of entities have only a single beneficial 
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owner. Rarely could there be more than three.319 Collecting the information 
would have a negligible effect, if any, on the time a state would need to 
process an incorporation. 
The more likely explanation for the bill’s powerful opposition is that 
many charter buyers are unwilling to disclose their status as beneficial 
owners. Furnishing anonymous entities to the world market is a major 
industry and the American states are the industry leaders. Enactment of the 
bill would be the first step in killing that industry.  
Enactment of the bill would be an important step toward the elimination 
of anonymous entities, but more would be necessary. Enactment would 
force AEs and criminals to furnish beneficial ownership information, but it 
would not assure the information’s correctness. To assure correctness, 
governments would have to collect identity documents and check them 
against the records of their issuers. The FATF recommendation 
contemplates that the governments conduct the verifications at the time the 
entities are created.  
To make effective use of the information, governments would also need 
to assess the plausibility of claims to beneficial ownership. In doing so, the 
investigators would be restricted by privacy laws and national borders. 
 The imposition of programming limitations on artificial general 
intelligence may draw opposition independent of the opposition to entity 
system reform. Programming limitations could, for example, impair the 
effectiveness of algorithm-controlled weapons systems, thus affecting the 
balance of military power. They could also impair the development of AGI 
by limiting innovation. From the perspective of humanity as a whole, the 
safer course would be to impose the limitations. But that is hardly a 
sufficient condition to produce legislation.  
The development of those limitations will undoubtedly be the subject of 
political debate. If AEs exist and are profitable by that time, they would 
probably have, under U.S. law, the constitutional right to participate in the 
debate, and the practical ability to do so anonymously. In Citizens United, 
the Supreme Court held that corporations have the constitutional right to 
spend money to influence the outcomes of elections.320 In making that 
decision, the Court expressed its understanding that the identities of the 
spenders would be disclosed.321 But to date, the beneficial owners of the 
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contributed funds have managed to conceal their identities through multiple 
layers of artificial entities.322 Although about eighty percent of Americans 
have thought, almost since the decision was made in 2010, that it should be 
reversed,323 no reversal is imminent. If Citizens United remains in effect 
during the AE debate, AEs may themselves play a major role in the debate. 
AEs may also gain legal traction from three other constitutional 
doctrines. States may not enact laws that interfere with the free flow of 
interstate commerce.324 Nor may they deny entities the equal protection of 
their laws.325 Lastly, the United States Supreme Court has come perilously 
close to declaring that the internal affairs doctrine is constitutionally 
mandated, and the Delaware Supreme Court has held that it is 
constitutionally mandated.326 
Thus, it is not at all clear that the entity system can be fixed in time to 
prevent the development of wealthy and powerful AEs. If it is not, the entity 
system probably cannot be fixed at all. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
AEs are inevitable because they have three advantages over human-
controlled businesses. They can act and react more quickly, they don’t lose 
accumulated knowledge through personnel changes, and they cannot be 
held responsible for their wrongdoing in any meaningful way. 
AEs constitute a threat to humanity because the only limits on their 
conduct are the limits the least restrictive human creator imposes. As the 
science advances, algorithms’ abilities will improve until they far exceed 
those of humans. What remains to be determined is whether humans will be 
successful in imposing controls before the opportunity to do so has passed.  
This Article has addressed a previously unexplored aspect of the 
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artificial-intelligence-control problem. Giving algorithms control of entities 
endows algorithms with legal rights and gives them the ability to transact 
anonymously with humans. Once granted, those rights and abilities would 
be difficult to revoke. Under current law, algorithms could inhabit entities 
of most types and nationalities. They could move from one type or 
nationality to another, thereby changing their governing law. They could 
easily hide from regulators in a system where the controllers of non-
publicly-traded entities are all invisible. Because the revocation of AEs’ 
rights and abilities would require the amendment of thousands of entity 
laws, the entity system is less likely to function as a means of controlling 
artificial intelligence than as a means by which artificial intelligence will 
control humans.  
Entity law is not only incapable of regulating AEs, it is incapable of 
regulating much of anything. The entity system is grounded in three 
principles. First, an entity can incorporate anywhere, regardless of the 
location of its operations. Second, an entity chartered in one jurisdiction can 
do business in virtually any other jurisdiction. Third, while operating in 
those other jurisdictions, the entity continues to be governed by the entity 
law under which it was formed. Together, those principles implicitly define 
a regulatory competition through the sale of entity charters. Each 
government competes for a share in billions of dollars of revenues annually 
by promoting and selling its entities and the regulation that accompanies 
them.   
To regulate is to restrict. A competition to sell restrictions will, of course, 
be won by the jurisdiction that provides the fewest. Thus, the natural 
culmination of charter competition is a system that does not restrict at all. 
That result is not unintended. It is essentially what Romano touted as the 
“genius of American corporate law.”327 By embracing the charter 
competition, the United States has become the world’s largest supplier of 
anonymous entities and enabled its corporate service providers to achieve 
the world’s lowest rate of compliance with the international standards 
designed to prevent terrorist financing and money-laundering.328 
Because they believed that government should not regulate the 
relationship among the corporation and its officers, directors, and 
shareholders, charter competition advocates have perpetuated a system that 
hardly regulates at all. What the advocates apparently failed to realize is that 
entity law applies to much more than the entities’ internal affairs. AEs have 
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no internal affairs, yet entity law will govern the key issues that determine 
their viability.  
Chartering governments decide who—or what—can have the rights of a 
person by acting through an entity. Chartering governments also decide 
what information about the human actors will be available to the public, 
what information will be available to police and prosecutors, how quickly 
that information will be made available and at what expense, how quickly 
and easily an entity can flee a jurisdiction to avoid the jurisdiction’s current 
or proposed regulations, and even whether a tort creditor can recover against 
an entity’s owner. Chartering governments decide these issues even when 
the effects are felt entirely outside the chartering jurisdiction. 
The AE threat dramatically illustrates the fundamental weakness of 
regulatory competition as a policy tool. Once the charter competition was 
up and running, the economic, political, and legal systems adjusted. Ending 
the competition now would be so disruptive it is almost impossible. The 
entity system is not merely a system that will not regulate when regulation 
is not needed, it is a system that cannot regulate even when regulation is 
needed.  
The assertion that charter competition is harmless because entity law 
governs only entities’ internal affairs is no longer plausible. As the example 
of AEs illustrates, entity law governs far more than the internal affairs of a 
corporation. It determines the very nature of the corporate personality. The 
survival of the human race may depend on recognition of that fact.   
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